Director of Antitrust and Innovation Policy
Information Technology and Innovation Foundation
Joe Coniglio is the Director of Antitrust and Innovation Policy at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation. His work encompasses all aspects of antitrust and innovation policy, with a focus on digital platforms, monopolization policy, and dynamic competition. Joe has published several articles addressing contemporary issues in antitrust law, competition policy, and political economy, including a paper co-authored with former FTC Chairman Timothy J. Muris titled "What Brooke Group Joined Let None Put Asunder: The Need for the Price-Cost and Recoupment Prongs in Analyzing Digital Predation" for the Global Antitrust Institute's Report for the Digital Economy.
Joe previously worked as an associate at the law firms Sidley Austin and Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, where he specialized in civil non-merger investigations and counseling for large technology and financial services companies. He also advised clients on issues involving the intersection of antitrust and intellectual property, including a brief before the Ninth Circuit in FTC v. Qualcomm. Prior to that, Joe worked as a legal intern at both the FTC and FCC, as well as a paralegal specialist in Technology and Digital Platforms Section of the DOJ's Antitrust Division. Joe received his J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center and his B.A. in economics and philosophy from Vassar College.
Comments to the FTC and DOJ Regarding Premerger Notification Reporting and Waiting Period Requirements
The proposal to use a 10-year time frame that does not exempt acquisitions of entities with annual net sales or total assets over $10 million is not only vitiated by an ill-founded concern about underenforcement of killer acquisitions in fast-moving technology markets, but would place additional burdens on parties complying with the HSR Act that are not justified by their informational value to agencies.
United States v. Google and the Legacy of the Microsoft Case
United States v. Google represents the most significant challenge to a large technology company on the grounds that it abused a monopoly position since the seminal United States v. Microsoft.
Comments to the Justice Department and FTC Regarding Draft Merger Guidelines
Not only are the proposed concentration thresholds in irreconcilable tension with the economic evidence surrounding the relationship between market structure and innovation, but established antitrust law counsels against the use of a structural presumption to satisfy the government’s prima facie burden in markets characterized by Schumpeterian competition.