China

The Biden administration (and the EU) need to carefully protect the role that patents and SEPs play in their respective ability to innovate and compete with China.

China has had a dismissive attitude about its obligations as a member of World Trade Organization ever since it joined the organization.

It’s finally clear to most in Washington that the United States faces a major competitor in China in defense, advanced technology industries, and other realms. There’s also a growing bipartisan consensus that the United States needs to limit China’s advancement. But that’s where the consensus breaks down.

As the world closely observes several recent diplomatic exchanges, a question looms large: Are traditional methods of engagement effective in addressing the growing challenges posed by China’s techno-economic malpractice to U.S. economic interests and those of other democratic market economies?

America’s imports from China look large because China is so large. But proportionally, they’re less than those from the other Asian tigers. America’s large trade deficit stems primarily from its lack of high-value manufacturing exports, not just to China but to the world.

Recent administrations have not done enough to ensure GSP beneficiaries play fair in digital trade. To ensure the GSP program remains relevant in supporting modern U.S. trade, Congress should add explicit criteria defining what constitutes a digital trade barrier.

The implications of this should be clear. The only way for the United States to compete with dollar-adjusted lower manufacturing wages in China is for manufacturers in America to be more productive—and automation, including robotics, is the key way to do that.

The reality is that if America does not do both—speed itself up, and slow China down—then it will likely lose the techno-economic race in the advanced, traded-sector industries that are most strategically important for the country’s dual-use industrial base and national security.

The rivalry between the United States and China has significant diplomatic, military, and ideological aspects, but its most important dimensions are technological and economic.

Huawei—the world’s largest telecommunications firm—is among the most targeted Chinese firms due to concerns that it assists the Chinese Communist Party spy on the United States (and its allies). While sanctions against Huawei are justifiable, the Biden administration needs to ensure that these sanctions don’t inadvertently harm other U.S. technological and economic interests.