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Schumpeter Project on Competition Policy

Schumpeter Project on Competition Policy

The Schumpeterian perspective represents a new intellectual framework for practical antitrust reforms that enable the innovation economy. That’s Schumpeter Project’s mission: to advance dynamic competition policy with innovation as a central concern for antitrust enforcement, not a secondary consideration.

Featured Publications

The Process of Creative Destruction, Illustrated: The US Retail Industry

The Process of Creative Destruction, Illustrated: The US Retail Industry

The process of “creative destruction,” whereby new technologies and business models displace old ones, is key to growth and innovation. The evolution of the retail industry illustrates why it is beneficial and sheds light on the pitfalls of current legislative and regulatory efforts to limit it.

The Digital Markets Act: A Triumph of Regulation Over Innovation

The Digital Markets Act: A Triumph of Regulation Over Innovation

The Digital Markets Act presents three fundamental challenges as it nears adoption: First, it will increase regulatory fragmentation. Second, its disproportionate blanket obligations and prohibitions will be economically detrimental and legally controversial. Third, it will be difficult to implement, as some of its provisions clash with other European regulations.

Monopolies Are Not Taking a Fifth of Your Wages

Monopolies Are Not Taking a Fifth of Your Wages

A recent Treasury report on labor market competition provided a misleading narrative about labor market concentration and its effect on workers. Labor market power is largely due to labor market frictions, not concentration. Firms are not profiting at the expense of workers.

American Precautionary Antitrust: Unrestrained FTC Rulemaking Authority

American Precautionary Antitrust: Unrestrained FTC Rulemaking Authority

The FTC plans to follow Europe’s precautionary approach to antitrust by enacting preemptive rules of per se illegality. But American precautionary antitrust is both unlawful and economically harmful, as it opposes dynamic competition, which benefits consumers and innovation.

Schumpeterian Takes on Pending Antitrust Bills

Schumpeterian Takes on Pending Antitrust Bills

Instead of promoting competitive digital markets for the benefit of consumers, many of the techlash-driven proposals advancing in the House and Senate would inhibit innovation and skew competition to the detriment of the digital economy and consumers alike.

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September 22, 2022

The EU’s Digital Markets Act: A Triumph of Regulation Over Innovation?

Watch ITIF’s Schumpeter Project on Competition Policy's event for an expert panel discussion and presentation of a new report on the challenges ahead in implementing and enforcing the DMA.

August 10, 2022

Dynamic Antitrust Discussion Series: Commissioner Noah Phillips

In this conversation, Director of the Schumpeter Project on Competition Policy, Aurelien Portuese, sits down with Commissioner Noah Phillips of the Federal Trade Association to learn about his views on the current state of antitrust and competition policy and the state of capitalism in America.

June 27, 2022

Dynamic Antitrust Discussion Series: Antitrust and Inflation

Watch the latest installment of the Dynamic Antitrust series, where Julie Carlson moderates a panel with antitrust and inflation experts to get their views on the relationship between corporate concentration and inflation.

June 3, 2022

Assessing the Neo-Brandeisian Revolution: Looking for Mr. Schumpeter?

Watch this expert discussion about how to integrate the Schumpeterian perspective into competition policy as an alternative to the Neo-Brandeisian movement agenda.

April 28, 2022

Dynamic Antitrust Discussion Series: “Chief Economists’ Perspectives on Horizontal Merger Guidelines”

Please join ITIF for the latest in a series of discussions on “dynamic antitrust.” In this installment, Julie Carlson will sit down with former chief economists from the DOJ and FTC to discuss their views on the planned revisions to the guidelines.

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HadiHadi Houalla

Research Assistant

TrelysaTrelysa Long

Research Assistant

AurelienAurelien Portuese

Director, Schumpeter Project on Competition Policy


PhilippePhilippe Aghion

Professor, College de France, LSE, & INSEAD

Christopher G.Christopher G. Caine

President and Founder, Mercator XXI

RichardRichard Gilbert

Professor Emeritus, UC Berkeley

DavidDavid Kappos

Partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP

MaureenMaureen Ohlhausen

Former Acting Chairwoman, Federal Trade Commission

DavidDavid Teece

Executive Chairman, Berkeley Research Group

More From the Center

March 14, 2023|Blogs

Breaking Up Big Business Would Not Reduce Lobbying

Breaking up large corporations actually would not reduce lobbying. In fact, it would have quite the opposite effect.

March 13, 2023|Reports & Briefings

Platforms Are the New Organizational Paradigm

Just as there was opposition to the corporate economy in the early 1900s, there is opposition to the platform economy today. But limiting “platformization” would have considerable long-lasting economic costs for the nation and consumers.

March 7, 2023|Op-Eds & Commentary

The Digital Coase Theorem and the News

In Competition Policy International, Aurelien Portuese writes on digital news aggregators and why the traditional approach favors inefficiency and stifles innovation.

March 2, 2023|Testimonies & Filings

Comments to the Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry of Canada Regarding the Future of Competition Policy

The regulatory onslaught from Europe will not transpose well in Canada because of the latter’s idiosyncratic circumstances: a smaller market, fewer innovation capabilities, and a more commercially avoidable market.

March 1, 2023|Reports & Briefings

The Flawed Analysis Underlying Calls for Antitrust Reform: Revisiting Lina Khan’s “Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox”

In the 2017 law journal article that established her reputation, now FTC Chair Lina Khan ignored or misapplied the economics of two-sided markets, mischaracterized competitive conditions, and did not consider the pro-competitive effects of Amazon’s conduct.

January 18, 2023|Reports & Briefings

Oops! It Turns Out Aggressive Antitrust Would Increase Business Lobbying

The common refrain that big business wields disproportionate political power is overblown. Lobbying data indicates that large firms spend relatively less on lobbying than do smaller firms.

January 2, 2023|Op-Eds & Commentary

Will Antitrust Undermine the Future of Gaming?

If the FTC is concerned that games like “Call of Duty” may be removed from competing platforms, then the solution is simple: It could settle with Microsoft, requiring the company to make this content available on other platforms.

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