Nominee Biung-Ghi Ju, who is set to become the next chair of the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), has already indicated that, if confirmed, he “would not proceed with the so-called Online Platform Act.” This commitment is encouraging. But in Korea’s volatile policy environment, regulatory debates rarely remain settled, and the temptation to revive platform-specific legislation could resurface. Moreover, Ju himself has suggested that even in the absence of new ex ante regulation, the KFTC could still expand enforcement against technology companies—underscoring the risk that the agency could pursue more stringent action under political pressure.

Instead of reviving such proposals, the better alternative is a disciplined, balanced enforcement approach under Korea’s existing framework. The rules proposed under the Online Platform Act are unnecessary, rest on the flawed premise that regulation can manufacture fairness, and risk undermining U.S.–Korea relations while advantaging China.

1. Fairness Concerns Do Not Justify Regulation

Previous KFTC leadership cited vague notions of “fairness” to justify regulatory intervention—even while acknowledging that Korea’s digital economy is globally competitive. This justification raises serious concerns. The KFTC conceded that South Korea’s platform markets are not only thriving but also innovating at a global scale. This undermines any presumption of market failure, which is typically the economic rationale for regulatory intervention. Indeed, unlike identifiable economic concerns—such as monopolization, entry barriers, or consumer harm—in practice, “fairness” is an abstract or undefined reason for regulation. Basing intervention on vague social concepts invites arbitrary enforcement and risks chilling innovation.

2. There Is No “Global Consensus” on Platform Regulation

The KFTC has previously claimed that there is a “global consensus” acknowledging the urgent need to regulate “unfair practices stemming from platform dominance.” However, this characterization significantly overstates international alignment on digital competition regulation. First, advanced economies such as the United States and Taiwan have refrained from adopting DMA-style regulation, opting instead to rely on their existing ex post antitrust frameworks. Second, Canada and Kenya have pursued amendments to their competition laws rather than embracing sweeping, prescriptive rules like the DMA. Third, as ITIF has pointed out, even for jurisdictions that are pursuing digital antitrust regulations, there are a variety of very different perspectives from the European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA)—which has already faced criticism for high compliance costs, legal uncertainty, and questionable impact on broader European competitiveness. One thing is sure: There is no global consensus over platform regulation.

3. American Legislative Developments Do Not Support Korea’s Approach

The KFTC has previously also asserted that similar “bills to promote competition in platform markets have been proposed in the United States,” implying that Korea’s regulatory approach is aligned with the legislative momentum of the U.S. However, the KFTC’s reference to a proposed—but ultimately failed—bill misrepresents U.S. political reality and falsely suggests American endorsement of Korea’s regulatory path. While several DMA-inspired bills have been introduced in the U.S. Congress—such as the American Innovation and Choice Online Act by Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN)—none have been enacted into law because none could command anywhere near majority support. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that such a bill would be approved by the Trump administration, which already withdrew the Biden administration’s executive order on competition and supports deregulation. Moreover, Federal Trade Commission Chairman Andrew Ferguson has openly criticized the DMA, further indicating that the administration’s approach is the opposite of what the KFTC suggests.

4. “Rapidly Changing” Digital Markets Do Not Justify New Ex Ante Laws

Another concern the KFTC has expressed has been that enforcement under existing laws “faces limitations in responding to the rapidly changing digital market,” the KFTC has concluded that this justifies expanding its regulatory framework with new ex ante powers. There are several reasons why this is wrong. First, rapid change in digital markets is not a problem—it is the hallmark of a dynamic, competitive market. In such environments, premature and overly rigid ex ante regulation risks suppressing innovation, deterring investment, and obstructing the natural process of “creative destruction.” Second, Korea’s existing competition regime—including the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA)—has repeatedly shown itself capable of addressing platform conduct, including several (often heavy-handed) enforcement actions against American tech firms like Google, Meta, Coupang, and Qualcomm. Third, the existence of enforcement delays does not mean that ex ante regulation can solve the problems more effectively than the current framework. The real challenge for enforcement is ensuring that it remains balanced and evidence-based, rather than rapid, politically motivated, or selectively targeted.

5. The PMA De Facto Discriminates Against Foreign Companies

Although framed as neutral, the PMA’s size-based triggers would disproportionately affect U.S. platforms (e.g. Apple, Google, Amazon), while largely sparing Korean firms. Indeed, in Korea, existing enforcement patterns also raise red flags: Major antitrust actions have disproportionately targeted U.S. firms such as Qualcomm, Google, and Coupang. The risk is that the PMA becomes a new discretionary tool to replicate this enforcement asymmetry, while shielding domestic champions from equivalent scrutiny. Disproportionate efforts against American companies would invite trade disputes, erode trust with key allies, and undermine the credibility of Korea’s commitment to non-discriminatory digital governance.

6. The Platform Bills Give a Competitive Advantage to China

While the PMA targets large U.S. firms, it would leave Chinese platforms largely untouched, due to their lower market share in Korea—at least for now. The result is a strategic imbalance where U.S. firms face heightened compliance obligations and regulatory scrutiny, while Chinese competitors—despite growing influence—are allowed to expand with fewer constraints. For example, as ITIF has explained, “this could take the form of Chinese rivals utilizing procompetitive integrations on mobile platforms that enhance user privacy and security which Apple and Google are forbidden from implementing due to regulation.” This could undermine the integrity of Korea’s regulatory neutrality, give Chinese platforms an unfair competitive head start in shaping Korea’s digital ecosystem, and risk straining the U.S.–Korea alliance.

As Korea’s new KFTC leadership takes shape, the priority should not be reviving platform-specific legislation but strengthening competition policy under its existing legal framework. Ex ante platform rules would not deliver competitiveness; instead, they would impose rigid thresholds, strain alliances with the United States, and open space for Chinese rivals. The better course is to reaffirm the MRFTA, which has already proven capable of addressing platform conduct but must be applied with greater discipline: nondiscriminatory, evidence-based, and anchored in due process. By resisting political pressure for new laws and focusing instead on balanced enforcement, the next KFTC can correct past perceptions of overreach while preserving the dynamism of Korea’s digital economy. For soon-to-be Chairman Ju, the mandate is clear: Lead by example with strategic foresight.