Comments to UK’s Competition and Markets Authority on Microsoft's Proposed Strategic Market Status Designation
Introduction and Summary
On May 14, 2026, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) launched an initial investigation under Part 1 of its Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers (DMCC) Act to determine whether Microsoft has strategic market status (SMS) in its business software ecosystem.[1] Following this investigation, the CMA published its proposed decision to designate Microsoft as having SMS in relation to this ecosystem on October 16 and invited interested parties to share their views.[2]
The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) is an independent, nonprofit, and nonpartisan think tank based in Washington, DC. ITIF’s mission is to formulate, evaluate, and promote policy solutions that accelerate innovation and boost productivity to spur growth, opportunity, and progress. The University of Pennsylvania has recognized ITIF as setting the global standard for excellence in science and technology policy, and as one of the overall “Top 40 U.S. Think Tanks.”[3]
ITIF is grateful for the opportunity to provide comments to the CMA on its proposed decision, particularly given that the designation would include products and services beyond what is currently covered under “core platform services” by the EU Digital Markets Act (DMA). While ITIF appreciates the CMA’s exclusion of Microsoft Edge from the business software ecosystem, ITIF remains concerned by the inclusion of the Windows Operating System, the Office 365 suite, and the Copilot artificial intelligence (AI) assistant, among other software services and products offered by the company.
ITIF’s comments make three principal arguments. First, many of the products covered by the SMS designation do not possess substantial and entrenched market power (SEMP) or a position of strategic significance (POSS). Second, the CMA’s decision extends the scope of designation beyond even the already overly inclusive DMA. Third, the Competition Act’s ex post competition law framework is sufficient to address potential concerns involving products with SEMP and POSS, including anticompetitive tying, without undermining incentives to innovate through an overly broad SMS designation.
The SMS Designation Includes Software Lacking Substantial and Entrenched Market Power and a Position of Strategic Significance
Under the DMCCA, SMS designations are reserved for a company whose annual turnover exceeds either £1 billion in the UK or £25 billion globally, and whose digital activity possesses SEMP and POSS. A firm possesses SEMP if it faces weak competitive pressure and is unlikely to face significant competitive pressure over the next five years if it isn’t designated as an SMS. It occupies a POSS if it subjectively possesses any combination of “a position of significant size or scale,” “a significant number of other undertakings us[ing] the digital activity,” the ability “to extend its market power to a range of other activities,” and the ability “to determine…the ways in which other undertakings conduct themselves.”[4]
While Microsoft satisfies the global turnover requirement and its products are certainly digital activities, many of its business software ecosystem offerings lack POSS, SEMP, or both.[5] For instance, while it is possible that enough of Microsoft Copilot’s 100 million monthly active users are based in the United Kingdom so as to put it in a position of significant size, Copilot’s position in the general AI market is neither substantial nor entrenched. Its global market share of just 1.3 percent pales in comparison to ChatGPT’s 52.3 percent, Gemini’s 26.3 percent, Claude’s 11.2 percent, Grok’s 3.4 percent, and even Perplexity’s 1.8 percent.[6] Similarly, while Windows and Office 365 may possess POSS in the UK, both face intense inter-ecosystem competition from Apple’s macOS and iWork suite, and Google’s ChromeOS and Google Workplace. By including products without market power in its definition of Microsoft’s business software ecosystem, the CMA departs from the DMCCA’s tailored, product-specific approach to embrace a DMA-style, company-specific approach that fails to account for the dynamics and realities of the relevant individual digital service markets.
The CMA should therefore reconsider the inclusion of each individual offering in the proposed designation and ensure that every designated digital activity independently satisfies the statutory requirements for SEMP and POSS. Products that do not meet these thresholds should be excluded, rather than swept into the designation simply because they are part of Microsoft's broader business software ecosystem.
The SMS Designation Goes Beyond Even the Digital Markets Act
Sarah Cardell, CMA Chief Executive, considers proportionality to be at the heart of the UK’s digital markets competition regime. The regime is designed not to merely govern the very largest companies, but “to [regulate] individual designated activities within [them].”[7] Yet the inclusion of Microsoft’s PC operating system, productivity software suite, server operating system, relational database management system, and security software under a single market definition more closely resembles the DMA’s designation of “gatekeeper” companies in the provision of so-called “core platform services” than an SMS designation system that “is bespoke and tailored to fast-moving digital markets.” Designations that overbroadly capture services or companies for subjection to potential conduct requirements (CRs) and pro-competition interventions (PCIs) could force companies to delay new products, features, or improvements while diverting resources toward regulatory compliance rather than such improvements. For instance, the cost of and uncertainty around conduct mandates that Apple and Google face as gatekeepers under the EU’s DMA led to delays of up to a year in the rollout of cutting-edge AI features such as Apple Screen Mirroring and Google Search AI summaries to consumers and businesses in the EU relative to their United States counterparts.[8]
Although the DMCCA is theoretically more narrowly tailored than the DMA, many more Microsoft products will be scrutinized under the former than under the latter. Under the DMA, Microsoft is presently designated as a gatekeeper of only two core platform services: Windows (operating system) and LinkedIn (social network).[9] Even if the European Commission’s unjustified preliminary designation of Microsoft’s Azure cloud service is confirmed, the number of Microsoft offerings considered by the DMA would total just three.[10] By contrast, the SMS designation of Microsoft’s entire business software ecosystem includes over 40 unique product offerings across the five categories.
The CMA should therefore define any SMS designation narrowly around specific digital activities, rather than extending it across Microsoft's entire business software ecosystem. Such an approach would better reflect the DMCCA's product-specific design, preserve the proportionality of the regime, and reduce the risk of discouraging innovation and investment in the United Kingdom.
The UK’s Ex Post Framework Is Sufficient to Address Anticompetitive Behavior
If the proposed SMS designation is confirmed, then dozens of Microsoft products will become potential targets of potential conduct requirements (CRs) and pro-competition interventions (PCIs). Like the DMA, neither CRs nor PCIs are subject to judicial review. Moreover, many of the DMCCA’s CRs are analogous to the DMA’s ex ante mandates. CRs include bans on self-preferencing, anti-steering, discrimination, tying, restricting interoperability, and “using data unfairly,” as well as requirements mandating disclosures, advance notice of business changes, neutral presentation of default options, and to “trade on fair and reasonable terms.”[11] Noncompliance with CRs carries a maximum penalty of 5 percent of worldwide daily turnover—equal to that specified by the DMA.[12] Unlike CRs, PCIs require the CMA to conduct a market study and find an adverse effect on competition. Once the statutory burden has been met, the CMA may use PCIs to order even more substantial business changes than those compelled by CRs, such as interoperability design mandates and structural remedies. As with CRs and the DMA, noncompliance with PCIs carries a maximum penalty of 5 percent of worldwide daily turnover or 10 percent of global annual turnover.
Unlike the DMA’s ex-ante obligations, which apply to all designated gatekeepers, both CRs and PCIs are individually formulated by the CMA for each SMS-designated firm and subject to both a four-part proportionality test and mandatory public consultation prior to taking effect.[13] Despite this notable departure from the DMA, uncertainty about what obligations an SMS-designated firm may be subject to still significantly complicates and heightens regulatory risk for firms operating the digital services and platforms that scores of British businesses and consumers rely upon. This increases the expected costs of doing business in the United Kingdom while chilling incentives to invest in, experiment with, and deliver new products and improvements. This outcome would defeat the UK government’s stated goal of making “it easier and simpler for companies to do business [in order to give] them the stability to make long-term investments,”[14] while making rival national markets more attractive by comparison.
The significant upfront investments required to create new technologies and services, including those with high potential value albeit uncertain ultimate outcomes, depend on a predictable regulatory climate and costs. Expanding SMS designation to firms for which there is a weak case for doing so sends a signal to other firms that they could face significant liability and risks in the United Kingdom for future projects, especially if they are growing. Such costs and uncertainty have already resulted in the delayed rollout of cutting-edge AI features by Apple and Google in the EU due to the DMA, as noted above.
The rationale for potentially jeopardizing the UK innovation ecosystem through an unprecedented and broad SMS designation is unclear, given that the United Kingdom has not taken significant action against Microsoft for unilateral anticompetitive conduct in decades, despite having tools within existing ex post competition laws like the UK Competition Act to do so.[15] The Act prohibits firms from abusing their dominance in one market to make “the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which…have no connection with the subject of the contracts,” i.e., tying.[16] For instance, at the time of this writing, Microsoft is facing a private lawsuit from messaging platform Slack and related companies under the Competition Act in London’s High Court.[17] Slack alleges that Microsoft engaged in anticompetitive tying by bundling Teams with its Microsoft 365 suite, arguing that this distorted the market, locked out rivals, and harmed consumers by limiting choice.[18] The litigation illustrates that existing competition law provides a means to investigate and adjudicate specific allegations of anticompetitive conduct without imposing broad ex ante obligations across an entire ecosystem. Where such conduct is demonstrated, the CMA retains the ability to enforce the Competition Act; where it is not, there is little justification for imposing additional regulatory obligations absent a separate showing of competitive harm.
The CMA should therefore demonstrate why existing competition law is inadequate to address specific, identifiable competition concerns before subjecting Microsoft's broader business software ecosystem to ex ante regulation. The mere possibility that Microsoft could engage in anticompetitive conduct does not justify imposing additional regulatory obligations across dozens of products and services, particularly where many do not independently satisfy the statutory criteria for SMS designation.
Conclusion
The CMA’s 4Ps framework emphasizes “proportionality by empowering the CMA to operate in a targeted and flexible way.”[19] Yet the proposed designation of more than 40 Microsoft offerings, many of which fail to satisfy the requirements for SMS designation, falls short of this standard. ITIF urges the CMA to reconsider its proposed designation, focusing on individual digital activities that demonstrably meet the statutory criteria and relying on existing competition law to address specific anticompetitive conduct. A more targeted approach would protect competition without unnecessarily discouraging investment and innovation or depriving British consumers and businesses of new products and features.
Thank you for your consideration.
Endnotes
[1]. Press Release, CMA launches strategic market status investigation into Microsoft’s business software ecosystem, GOV UK (May 14, 2026), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-launches-strategic-market-status-investigation-into-microsofts-business-software-ecosystem.
[2]. Competition and Markets Authority, “Proposed Decision: SMS Investigation into Microsoft’s Business Software Ecosystem,” GOV.UK, consultation opened October 16, 2026, https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/proposed-decision-sms-investigation-into-microsofts-business-software-ecosystem [hereinafter Proposed Decision].
[3]. James G. McGann, 2020 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, Univ. of Pa. (2021), https://repository.upenn.edu/think_tanks/18.
[4]. Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024, c. 13, pt. 1, ch. 2, §§ 5–6 (UK), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2024/13/part/1/chapter/2; Competition and Markets Authority, “How the UK’s Digital Markets Competition Regime Works,” GOV.UK, January 7, 2025, last updated January 23, 2025, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/how-the-uks-digital-markets-competition-regime-works#criteria-for-strategic-market-status; Guidance on the Digital Markets Competition Regime Set Out in the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024, CMA194 (December 19, 2024), 10, para. 2.9, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6762f4f6cdb5e64b69e307de/Digital_Markets_Competition_Regime_Guidance.pdf.
[5]. Satya Nadella, “Shareholder Letter,” in Microsoft 2025 Annual Report (Microsoft, October 15, 2025), https://www.microsoft.com/investor/reports/ar25/index.html.
[6]. Evan Bailyn, “Microsoft Copilot Usage Statistics: November 2026,” First Page Sage, November 2, 2026, https://firstpagesage.com/seo-blog/microsoft-copilot-usage-statistics/; Evan Bailyn, “Top Generative AI Chatbots by Market Share: November 2026,” First Page Sage, November 2, 2026, https://firstpagesage.com/reports/top-generative-ai-chatbots/.
[7]. Sarah Cardell, “Driving Growth: How the CMA Is Rising to the Challenge” (November 21, 2024), GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/driving-growth-how-the-cma-is-rising-to-the-challenge.
[8]. See Satya Marar, The Case For and Against an American Digital Markets Act (DMA). Innovators Network, April 2026. https://innovatorsnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/The-Case-For-and-Against-an-American-Digital-Markets-Act-DMA-Satya-Marar-Innovators-Network-April-2026.pdf.
[9]. European Commission, “DMA Designated Gatekeepers,” Digital Markets Act, accessed November 10, 2026, https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/gatekeepers-portal_en#microsoft-corporation.
[10]. “[C]lassifying enterprise cloud infrastructure services as “gatekeepers” is particularly absurd, as there is no “gate” to keep. While consumer platforms act as two-sided intermediaries controlling direct access between business users and end consumers, cloud is a business-to-business input. Cloud providers supply computing power, storage, databases, networking and software tools that corporate clients use to build their own internal systems and customer-facing products. End users interacting with a mobile app rarely know or care which server infrastructure powers it in the background.” See Satya Marar, "The EC Punishing US Cloud Giants Won't Make Europe More Competitive." Fair Observer, September 28, 2026. https://www.fairobserver.com/united-states/the-ec-punishing-us-cloud-giants-wont-make-europe-more-competitive/; European Commission, “Commission Reaches Preliminary Position That Amazon’s and Microsoft’s Market Leading Cloud Services Should Be Designated under the DMA,” press release IP/26/1444, June 25, 2026, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_1444.
[11]. Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024, c. 13, § 20 (UK).
[12]. Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on Contestable and Fair Markets in the Digital Sector and Amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act), 2022 O.J. (L 265) 1, art. 31(1), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32022R1925#art_30; Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024, c. 13, § 86 (UK), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2024/13/body/2026-01-01#section-86.
[13]. Competition and Markets Authority, Digital Markets Competition Regime Guidance, CMA194 (London: CMA, December 19, 2024), 52, para. 3.33 and 79, para. 4.33.
[14]. UK Government, The UK’s Modern Industrial Strategy, CP 1451 at 12 (Nov. 2025), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69256e16367485ea116a56de/industrial_strategy_policy_paper.pdf
[15]. Joseph V. Coniglio, “Comments of ITIF,” Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, June 4, 2026, submitted to the Competition and Markets Authority in the Strategic Market Status Investigation into Microsoft’s Business Software Ecosystem, https://www2.itif.org/2026-comments-cma-sms-investigation-microsoft.pdf.
[16]. Competition Act 1998, c. 41, § 18(2)(d) (UK), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/41/section/18.
[17]. "Microsoft Facing UK Antitrust Lawsuit from Slack over Teams 'Bundling'," Reuters, April 27, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulation/microsoft-facing-uk-antitrust-lawsuit-slack-over-teams-bundling-2026-04-27/.
[18]. Kieran Devlin, "Microsoft Teams Slack Bundling: What is the UK Antitrust Lawsuit?," UC Today, April 29, 2026, https://uctoday.com/microsoft-teams-slack-bundling-antitrust-lawsuit.
[19]. Department for Business and Trade, Refining Our Competition Regime, at 3 (Jan. 20, 2026), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/696e4aa4bbcea094189e23b7/refining-our-competition-regime.pdf.
