Does the DMA Intentionally Target US Companies?

Recent discussions about U.S. tech leadership have reignited transatlantic tensions, with lawmakers such as Jim Jordan suggesting that the European Union might be deliberately targeting American tech giants through laws like the Digital Markets Act (DMA). While the European Commission insists these regulations are neutral tools to promote fair competition, many in the U.S. see them as part of a broader pattern of “economic lawfare”—the strategic use of regulation to curb foreign competitors while shielding domestic industries. What’s more, the stakes extend far beyond Europe, as countries like Australia, Brazil, and South Korea closely watch how the U.S. will respond as they consider similar regulations.

To analyze whether the DMA targets American firms, it is helpful to distinguish three key legal concepts: effect, intent, and motive.

• Effect refers to the law’s actual outcomes: Namely, whether the DMA disproportionately impacts American companies while leaving most European firms untouched.
• Intent, by contrast, relates to the deliberate design of the law—for example, the gatekeeper thresholds—and specifically whether it was structured to produce any such disproportionate effect on U.S. firms.
• Motive pertains to the underlying purpose of the DMA, such as whether it aims to promote fair competition or alternatively is driven by a potential anti-American animus.

With respect to the question of effect, it is undeniable that the DMA hits U.S. tech firms the hardest. Five of the seven designated gatekeepers—Google, Apple, Meta, Amazon, and Microsoft—are American. Indeed, the DMA’s thresholds, which are based on revenue, market capitalization, and user base, are extremely high, which ensures that the largest U.S. tech firms are captured while most European companies remain exempt. This contrasts with countries like Brazil and India, which have set lower thresholds, resulting in a more balanced approach that subjects numerous domestic firms to regulation. And of course, the actual enforcement of the DMA further reinforces concerns that the law disproportionately affects U.S. firms: Every DMA non-compliance investigation to date has been of an American tech company.

While it is clear that the DMA disproportionately harms U.S. firms—which is itself prima facie evidence of intentional targeting—it does not necessarily follow that the motive behind the law is anti-American. Rather, supporters of the DMA, as well as the law itself, argue that it is rooted in the EU’s broader efforts to ensure “fairness” in digital markets. In this sense, the DMA represents the EU doubling down on its traditional ordoliberal model of competition policy, which predates both U.S. big tech firms and the digital revolution. Moreover, any broader anti-American animus is inconsistent with the EU's deep economic, political, and security ties with the U.S., most notably through NATO. Put simply, while the DMA’s effects clearly disadvantage U.S. firms, it does not follow that its purpose is anti-American.

However, while the motive behind the DMA may not be anti-American, that does not mean it was not intended to have a disproportionate effect on U.S. firms. Indeed, one of the clearest indicators of intent comes from Andreas Schwab, a Member of the European Parliament and rapporteur of the DMA, who expressly stated that the law should focus on “the top five” companies rather than include any European firm just to “appease the U.S.” In fact, the European Parliament’s Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO) report, which Schwab drafted, explicitly advocated for adjusting the DMA’s thresholds in ways that kept U.S. firms within scope while exempting most EU competitors. This is a sort of smoking gun: If the DMA were truly intended to be neutral, these radical, last-minute amendments would not have been necessary.

The EU’s history of competition enforcement further supports the argument that the DMA is part of a broader pattern of targeting U.S. tech firms. Over the past fifteen years, the EU has imposed billions in competition-related fines on these companies—far exceeding the penalties levied on European firms. For example, the European Commission fined Apple €1.8 billion over App Store rules for music streaming providers, which is in addition to the Court of Justice of the European Union's judgment ordering the company to pay €13 billion for tax benefits it received from Ireland. Google has been fined over €8 billion on antitrust grounds, while Meta has been told to pay nearly €800 million. This prior course of conduct constitutes strong evidence that the DMA is merely the latest chapter in the EU’s ongoing and deliberate antitrust attack against American tech firms.

Finally, although the EU has publicly committed to boosting innovation and reducing regulatory red tape, the DMA is consistently treated as an exception. For example, former Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi’s landmark report emphasized the need to reduce bureaucracy to strengthen European competitiveness, but nonetheless praised the DMA. Likewise, in its Competitiveness Compass strategy, the Commission prioritizes cutting excessive regulations to foster innovation. But while the Commission has already announced its intention to withdraw certain digital regulations, such as the AI Liability Act, the DMA remains untouched. As such, if the EU is genuinely committed to reducing regulatory burdens, why is it doubling down on the DMA while relaxing other rules? The answer seems clear: Other regulations would place burdens on many European companies, but the DMA primarily targets American firms.

In conclusion, the DMA’s structure, legislative history, and enforcement patterns suggest that while its goal might be “fair competition,” it is ultimately intended to target and rein in U.S. tech titans. This has significant consequences. If Europe continues down the path of targeting American firms, the U.S. may retaliate, escalating regulatory and trade disputes. In fact, the Trump administration’s “Directive to Prevent the Unfair Exploitation of American Innovation” explicitly calls out the DMA, signaling the potential for future policy clashes. Furthermore, heavy-handed DMA enforcement threatens the unshakeable transatlantic alliance at a time when U.S.-EU unity is crucial—particularly in countering China’s global quest for techno-economic dominance.