Publications: Rodrigo Balbontin

The EU has an array of discriminatory policies that target major U.S. tech firms, a legitimate basis for action under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. U.S. policymakers should favor amicably negotiated solutions, but this tool is available as a last resort if necessary.

Country cases show that the Trump administration’s tariffs have had a paradoxical effect. They have given Washington short-term leverage in some bilateral negotiations, especially with countries seeking improved access to the U.S. market or deeper security and technology ties. But they have also accelerated a global search for optionality.

When U.S. technology companies compete in China, they capture revenue, learn technologies and trends from a critical market, and extend U.S.-built ecosystems. Forcing them out of China would weaken U.S. global competitiveness and give Chinese firms greater scale to shape technology ecosystems.

This Section 301 investigation rightly focuses on structural excess capacity. But its scope encompasses 16 economies rather than narrowly addressing the core cause of global trade upheaval—China’s mercantilism—thereby risking dilution of the blame for the country responsible for causing the need to recalibrate the global system.

China should come into full and immediate compliance with its WTO commitments; otherwise, as a last resort, the U.S. government should revoke China’s PNTR status. But policymakers should mitigate second-order effects, particularly on national power industries.

Countries in the Global South are key markets for Chinese and U.S.-allied national power industries, which require scale economies to flourish. U.S. policymakers should stop viewing them as a “backyard” and recognize that they are a key battlefield in an industrial war.

Boosting U.S. competitiveness in national power industries is necessary, but not sufficient to avoid losing to China. America also must take measures to slow the PRC’s progress toward global dominance. This report provides more than 100 actionable recommendations for the administration and Congress. Western allies should take many of the same steps.

MC14 exposed the WTO’s deepening dysfunction on digital trade and reform, underscoring why the United States needs a more strategic approach to global trade.

CFIUS’ procedures need to be strengthened to ensure that Chinese entities, particularly those influenced or backed by Chinese government influence or funding, cannot acquire U.S. companies or technology that could harm America’s economic or national security.

The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation’s Centre for Canadian Innovation and Competitiveness (CCIC) appreciates the opportunity to contribute to Global Affairs Canada’s consultation on a potential Canada-Mercosur Free Trade Agreement.