China

Beijing has provided significant support to its domestic polysilicon industry in a drive to establish Chinese firms as the dominant global suppliers of solar-grade polysilicon—and it wants its firms to expand their share of semiconductor-grade polysilicon.

The EU’s €376 million fine against Intel for decades-old conduct risks weakening a struggling Western chipmaker at a time when China is heavily investing to dominate the semiconductor industry.

The Strengthening Cyber Resilience Against State-Sponsored Threats Act is a timely and necessary response to the growing threat posed by state-sponsored cyber actors, particularly from China, but Congress should further refine it to truly future-proof the nation’s cybersecurity posture.

Section 337 was made into law to help address unfair foreign trade practices. It should be used vigorously to prevent the import of IP-infringing products from firms that systemically benefit from unfair government practices in non-market, non-rule-of-law economies such as China.

South Korea must reduce its reliance on China for both semiconductor exports and raw materials by strengthening alliances with the United States and its partners, aligning with export controls, and building a more secure, diversified supply chain to safeguard its long-term competitiveness in the global chip race.

China has spent the last five years escalating a coordinated cyber campaign against Europe—targeting lawmakers, infrastructure, and institutions—even as the EU considers deepening economic ties, exposing a dangerous contradiction in its approach to Beijing.

Engagement always comes at a price. The CCP is realist to the core, caring only about China. When it sees the U.S. government requesting cooperation, it sees leverage.

The Trump administration should maintain export controls where they clearly advance national security. But it should also ensure that U.S. companies can compete globally, reinvest in innovation, and remain central to the technologies that will shape the future.

The reality is that if the United States doesn’t become more like China, it will lose the battle for advanced technology leadership.

If the Starmer government thinks for one minute that the PRC will allow the UK to expand exports of anything with any real strategic importance, it is gravely mistaken. It’s time for competitive realism.