Over the past year, key U.S. allies South Korea and Japan have been embroiled in a political and trade dispute which has many antecedents in the past, but which has been exacerbated by more recent developments. While certainly concerning, the trade dispute in some ways has presented an opportunity for the United States to assert renewed diplomatic engagement in the region.
A careful review of the scholarly literature and industry cases suggests that the effect of Chinese economic growth and trade expansion, fueled by a corrosive set of “innovation mercantilist” policies and practices has been negative for innovation in most developed nations, including North America, Europe and Japan.
The United States, the EU, and Japan must band together in stronger trilateral partnership to pressure China into rolling back the mercantilist trade practices it uses to grow advanced, innovation-driven industries.
An examination of the scholarly literature shows that China’s mercantilist-powered economic rise and trade expansion have slowed the progress of innovation in the global economy—particularly in North America and Europe.
As the Trump administration implements the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act, the most important thing it should consider is that the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) should treat Chinese acquisitions of U.S. companies fundamentally different than acquisitions from our allies.
Since 2011, the U.S. government has spent over $400 million to provide broadband Internet access to 1.6 million people. A recent study investigated the impact that policies like these can have by examining the construction of broadband infrastructure across China, finding that every 10 percent increase in a region’s infrastructure increased firms’ productivity by 1.1 percent and workers’ wages by 4.2 percent.
Nearly 25 percent of all R&D expenditures in China come in the form of government subsidies to firms. It would be ideal if China dramatically reduced these innovation subsidies so American workers in innovation industries would face a level playing field, but the chances of that happening are slim to none. It is time for the federal government to step up its game and provide significantly more support for industrial R&D.
In essay for a compilation published by the Center for Strategic & International Studies, Nigel Cory explained that the United States and China have fundamentally different approaches to governance of the digital economy.
The United States leads the race for global advantage in artificial intelligence, at least for the time being, with China coming in second and the EU lagging behind. But China is poised to challenge U.S. dominance in coming years as it undertakes bold AI initiatives.
As Rob Atkinson writes for National Interest, the Trump administration should work toward market-based decoupling that effectively loosens China’s grip on global production.
The United States is continuing to drift in the wrong direction when it comes to federal funding for research and development (R&D). We parsed the numbers last year in a blog post that showed a five-decade-long slide had been accelerating since 2009. Now we have another year’s worth of data, and the picture is getting worse. At this pace, ITIF estimates the United States will fall behind China in R&D investment by 2021.
China is challenging the United States for market share and jobs in one of the highest value-added, most innovation-intensive industries—and the risks extend not just to the U.S. economy, but to global biopharma innovation.
Successful negotiations between two parties—whether between spouses, companies, or in the case of the trade war with China, countries—depend on each side having an honest assessment of their part in the conflict.
Until the last decade, major nations primarily provided financing to domestic exporters only as a lender of last resort. Since then, official medium- and long-term export crediting has more than doubled from $55 billion in 2008 to $129 billion in 2018.
A survey of allied think tanks summarizes what 23 nations and the EU are doing best when it comes to innovation policy, and where there are the greatest opportunities to improve. In many cases, the successes can serve as model policies for other countries to adopt.
In a column for Latin Trade Magazine, Rob Atkinson writes that the China-U.S. trade war can be an opportunity for Latin America.
Chinese policymakers cling to a strident view that national sovereignty in the cyber realm supersedes the need to enable data flows or cooperate with trading partners on important international norms.
In an article for National Review, Rob Atkinson writes that, at its heart, Chinese state capitalism is a system in which the purpose of firms — private and public — is to fulfill the goals of the Communist Party.
If China were only a copier, then the competitive threat to advanced economies would be limited. But there is no reason to believe China won’t follow the path of “Asian tigers” that rapidly evolved from copiers to innovators, which poses a serious threat.
As Rob Atkinson writes for Germany’s Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Margarethe Vestager’s decision to veto a merger between rail companies Alstom and Siemens shows how preventing EU firms from merging will result in weakened and shrunken European competitors.
Rob Atkinson testified before the Senate Small Business Committee on the issue of unfair Chinese trade and technology policies and practices and what the federal government should do in response.
In the decade since the global financial crisis, the Chinese government has moved aggressively to stimulate capital investment that will strengthen its competitive position, both domestically and in global markets.
The Washington trade and economics establishment has largely dismissed the threat Chinese innovation mercantilist practices pose to the U.S. economy, jobs and national security. The threat is serious, and China needs to be confronted, Rob Atkinson writes for the Washington Post.
As Eline Chivot and Daniel Castro write for Euronews, Europe will not win the global AI race by philosophizing on the sidelines. Instead, it needs to focus on putting in place the investment, skills, data, and regulations needed to outcompete China.
Recognizing that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are less profitable and innovative than private firms, China relinquished control of many SOEs beginning in the late 1990s, but still gives former SOEs easier access to loans and favors them in allocating subsidies. A new study analyzed the impacts of this, observing Chinese enterprises’ performance between 1998 and 2013.