It is important for conservatives to recognize that China poses a critical threat to America’s future and that we need a strong, technologically vibrant economy to respond. This in turn requires a national industrial policy.
There’s a battle being fought now for the soul of the global trade and economic system; it’s imperative that like-minded nations collaborate to emerge victorious in it.
The Biden administration and its “Neo-Brandeisian” supporters in Congress are seeking to break up large tech companies, but national-security-minded advisers warn it would strengthen America’s biggest adversary, China. They're right, just as an earlier generation of national security advisers was right to warn the Eisenhower administration against breaking up AT&T.
When national governments take steps to help their own economies, they can end up helping other economies, too. Sometimes that result is a win-win. But all too often the result is beneficial for a nation’s direct competitors in the fierce race for global advantage in key, innovation-based industries.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine is a horrific violation of international norms and human rights. Putin’s actions have sent a wake-up call to much of the world.
And rightly, many countries and companies are taking steps to penalize Russia for its aggressive actions, including economic sanctions.
This chapter examines China’s increasingly assertive efforts to influence international data governance, especially cross-border data flows, and promote its concept of “cyber sovereignty,” while also analyzing its restrictive approach to domestic data governance as the basis for its international advocacy efforts.
Acting against Chinese IP theft is a rare area of bipartisan support in U.S. trade policy, and the SECRETS Act provides a chance for U.S. policymakers and the Biden administration to take a stand against such parasitic practices by enacting a new law.
China’s rapid technological development has put tremendous pressure on the United States to remain competitive in strategically important industries. Rob and Jackie sat down with Matt Turpin to discuss what the United States has done so far to face the China challenge and what future policies should look like.
The long-run benefits of industrial intelligence in China shows that AI can be an engine for regional economic parity as well as for growth.
China views technology and the tech companies that produce it as strategic assets to be leveraged in a global race for geopolitical advantage. Rob and Jackie interviewed entrepreneur and strategist Sam Olsen, author of What China Wants, to discuss the implications of China’s technological development.
the Washington Post is dead wrong to conflate or equate the incentive measures envisioned in CHIPS with China’s subsidies to its semiconductor sector; they are mostly different in kind, scope, and intent.
Concerns about China’s rapid rise in recent decades have affected U.S. policies on technology, innovation, and industrial competitiveness. Rob and Jackie discussed the history of Chinese industrial policy and its implications for America and its allies with Barry Naughton, the So Kwanlok Chair of Chinese International Affairs at UC San Diego and author of The Rise of China’s Industrial Policy, 1978 to 2020.
ITIF hosted a discussion assessing China’s first 20 years in the WTO and exploring what policy measures like-minded nations can pursue in response to this pattern of deceit and dysfunction between China and the global trading system.
When innovation mercantilists such as China implement distortionary subsidies to inflate their volume of publications, they become less likely to carry breakthrough research essential to innovation.
Based on China’s economic characteristics, it should have seen about 212,200 resident patents in 2018, not 1.4 million.
ITIF hosted an event examining the extent of China’s industrial subsidies in high-tech industries and exploring available policy options to curtail these behaviors.
Most analysis of China’s mercantilist economic and trade practices has focused on its impacts on production and jobs in affected countries. But the aperture needs to be widened to consider the effect on innovation outside of China.
If the globalists want Americans to trust them again, they would be better off stopping the insults and fixing the very real trade and globalization problems facing America today.
Countries that value a rules-based global digital economy need to come together to enact new global data-management rules.
When today’s “useful idiots” compare China’s actions to the United States’ as the same, they are playing directly into Xi Jinping’s hands, weakening opposition to China’s destructive policies.
Global attitudes toward China are hardening, but diverging interests prevent effective allied action to counter its rise. That’s why America should focus on getting its own house in order. The key is better aligning U.S. multinational corporations’ interests with national interests.
Nearly 20 years after joining the World Trade Organization, China remains woefully short of meeting a broad range of commitments and responsibilities, to the detriment of both its trading partners and the international economic system.
China leverages antitrust law to achieve industrial policy objectives—including in the tech sectors that are crucial to its rivalry with the United States—but it does so through an insular bureaucracy that is surprisingly fragmented and therefore difficult for outsiders to understand.
An integrated clean manufacturing strategy will pay dividends for both the economy and the global environment.
The United States needs to shift from an approach to power trade that is based on advancing U.S. foreign policy interests to an approach that focuses on advancing U.S. competitive advantage against China, especially in critical advanced technology sectors.