Seoul’s Space Policy Is Finally Taking Shape. Now It Needs an Industrial Strategy.

Editor’s note: This column appeared in the South Korean publication TechM and is published here in English with permission.

South Korea has quietly entered a new phase of its space ambitions. What was once a collection of research programs scattered across ministries is now being pulled into the center of national strategy. The creation of the Korea Aerospace Administration and the elevation of the National Space Committee to the presidential level signal an institutional pivot: Seoul has decided that space is no longer a distant scientific aspiration but a domain of political, economic, and strategic competition.

This recognition comes at a time when the global space environment is being redrawn with unusual speed. SpaceX has transformed the economics of orbit with more than 10,000 Starlink satellites launched as of late 2025—many of them currently active. China is racing to match that scale through its state-led Guowang constellation, planned at 12,992 satellites, and the Shanghai-backed Qianfan network, which ultimately aims for 15,000. Analysts now estimate that by the early 2030s, tens of thousands of satellites, perhaps 60,000, could crowd low Earth orbit. For Korea, a country that historically entered new technological ecosystems late, the cost of not moving is becoming ever clearer.

Seoul has begun to stitch its disparate space efforts together. The government has laid out an exploration roadmap through 2045, spanning lunar missions, asteroid projects, planetary science, and broader space research. It has also begun integrating military reconnaissance satellites, national communications platforms, and private sector launch programs into a more coherent structure. Plans for regional space-industrial clusters and a “New Space” fund suggest an ambition to grow private capacity alongside state programs. And Korea has added a forward-looking telecommunications dimension: two 6G-standard LEO satellites and a pilot integrated space–terrestrial network by 2030. At MWC 2025, Korean institutions, including ETRI and KT, emphasized how 6G, quantum technology, and satellite networks will converge.

Still, the next stage of Korea’s space ambitions will require more than a reorganization of institutions. The exploration roadmap focuses heavily on mission objectives but is light on how data, technology, and intellectual property will be transferred to the private sector. NASA and the European Space Agency have long treated exploration as a platform for industrial development—opening mission data, fostering partnerships, and enabling downstream applications. Korea’s plans, by contrast, risk keeping exploration walled off from economic opportunity unless the government designs a clear strategy for commercialization.

Predictability is another test. The shift to methane-based reusable launch vehicles was strategically sound, but the abrupt policy redirection created uncertainty for firms that had already sunk costs into earlier plans. Space industries operate on long timelines and expensive infrastructure; inconsistent policy signals can freeze investment. China’s Guowang and Qianfan programs, whatever their flaws, have telegraphed stable goals and schedules, giving domestic suppliers clarity. Korea will need similar consistency across launch services, satellite manufacturing, ground systems, and space-based communications.

There is also the question of standards and openness. The next decade of the space economy will be built on the fusion of LEO constellations, 6G networks, autonomous mobility, precision navigation, and extended reality. These industries depend on interoperable infrastructure and accessible data. SpaceX, through sheer scale, is already shaping parts of the global communications ecosystem. The European Union is building its own LEO network with security and service frameworks defined from the outset. Korea has advanced research on 6G non-terrestrial networks but still lacks clear rules for satellite data access, ground-station compatibility, and equipment interoperability. This gap constrains not only large firms but also start-ups working in satellite analytics, synthetic GPS, mapping, logistics, and AR-enhanced services.

If Korea is serious about entering the space economy, it must treat industrial design—not just technology—as the main arena. Space launch will remain a small slice of value. The real contest lies in satellite manufacturing, network infrastructure, data processing, and the services built on top of them: everything from urban air mobility to disaster response, precision agriculture, global IoT, and immersive media. The United States and Europe already have thriving private ecosystems in these areas; China’s is expanding rapidly. Korea cannot afford to participate only at the edges.

The country has finally taken the first steps: stronger governance, a realistic launch strategy, a long-term exploration plan, and a recognition that 6G will be inseparable from the future of space-based communications. The challenge now is to turn these foundations into an economic strategy that opens data, sets standards, and enables private-sector leadership. Space is no longer about reaching the Moon. It is about building businesses on Earth.