Insufficient commercial spectrum could soon become a bottleneck to American wireless innovation, security, and leadership. Sufficient spectrum is necessary for everything from Wi-Fi, industrial automation, the space economy, 5G, and, soon, 6G. Congress took a strong step toward easing spectrum bottlenecks in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), which requires the federal government to find 800 megahertz of spectrum for commercial use.

Even after OBBBA, however, the spectrum policy conversation in Washington remains stuck on the defensive, with more concern about what bands to avoid than what to repurpose. While it is reasonable to preserve some incumbent uses, the United States’ spectrum strategy needs to be more than status quo maintenance.

This imperative is most important for the Department of War (DOW), which likely controls more spectrum than it needs. Rather than a defensive ethos, in which the DOW fights to protect its current holdings and then drags its feet on implementing a compromise, it should embrace the ways that rapid repurposing of substantial amounts of spectrum for commercial use will enhance the national security, economic growth, and diplomatic power of the United States.

DOW Spectrum Is Underused

The DOW undeniably needs spectrum for critical missions, but its use comes without the discipline of markets. For private spectrum holdings, the profit motive and market prices drive scarce bandwidth toward higher value uses. But DOW spectrum is held outside the market process, and without the feedback loop of the market, there is no signal when federal spectrum holdings are too capacious or inefficient.

This lack of big-picture incentives is replicated on the micro level as well. Individuals in federal agencies don’t benefit personally from shrinking their spectrum footprint, so the incentive is to be timid and keep as much spectrum as possible. Add in the rhetorical cudgel of “national security,” and federal spectrum use often escapes political oversight too. In short, the institutional structure of federal spectrum ownership incentivizes inefficiency.

Conversely, changing that structure will lead to gains in efficiency. The precise sources of inefficiency are usually classified, meaning internal executive-branch leadership will be essential to making the most of federal airwaves, but we can identify some categories of inefficiency leaders should evaluate and resolve.

Some possible sources of inefficiency are geographic; the DOW might use a certain band at a few installations across the country but lay claim to that spectrum band nationwide. This dynamic could produce absurd results in which an Army base in rural New York blocks deployment of advanced commercial communications technologies in Manhattan. DOW should, therefore, be forthright about exactly where it needs each wireless capability and relinquish exclusivity in other areas.

Sometimes these barriers are regulatory. Existing rules for commercial use in or near a federal band may be more restrictive than necessary to protect the federal use. In such cases, DOW should volunteer the true maximum commercial use its existing systems could accommodate, enabling greater commercial use while preserving critical DOW applications.

Sometimes the issues are technical. The maximum possible commercial use might be too limited because of outdated, poor-performing receivers that are more susceptible to interference and, therefore, prevent entry by advanced commercial systems. In such cases, beyond the need to increase efficiency, DOW should urgently seek to upgrade that equipment, not just to be a good steward of scarce resources, but to mitigate the national security vulnerabilities it engenders.

Inefficiency Endangers National Security

Perversely, DOW and its allies often advocate for the status quo by waving the slogan of “national security.” The reality is that it’s precisely the status quo that endangers national security.

Outdated technical equipment that monopolizes too much spectrum isn’t just a matter of efficiency or economic competitiveness. DOW systems with poorly performing receivers are vulnerable to adversaries. These systems are, therefore, a threat not only to the economic and geopolitical benefits of commercial wireless leadership, but also to national security directly.

A receiver that is vulnerable to interference from 5G transmissions is even more vulnerable to jamming attacks. And the more important the federal system, the more dangerous these vulnerabilities are. Commercial wireless companies have to follow FCC rules for which bands to use and when. If DOW can’t even function next door to these good actors, what’s the plan for these essential systems when they face attacks by enemies who don’t follow the rules?

Opening spectrum to commercial use can be a balm to this vulnerability. When the FCC auctions spectrum licenses in a band previously used by DOW, some of the proceeds can be used to make that band suitable for commercial operations by protecting incumbent operations. In short, commercial spectrum users will pay for the DOW to get better receivers so that the DOW and commercial operations can coexist. That’s a great deal for economic competitiveness and U.S. leadership in wireless ecosystem, but it’s also a great deal for direct national security since DOW systems would get state-of-the-art radios that perform their function better than the old ones.

If the DOW is offered more resilient receivers and turns them down, that is the threat to national security, regardless of the commercial implications. The fact that DOW intransigence also blocks American leadership in the next generation of wireless applications is just economic salt in the national security wound.

Be Aggressive, Not Defensive

DOW needs to move on from defending every megahertz of spectrum it currently possesses and, instead, be precise about what capabilities it needs to accomplish its missions. It should then gear its spectrum policy toward maintaining and enhancing those capabilities, not the particular system or particular frequencies used to provide it now.

This approach will allow DOW to open as much spectrum as possible to commercial use which will, in turn, enhance national security applications. Not only could eventual spectrum auctions directly buy more advanced, secure, and capable equipment, DOW can also take advantage of commercial wireless services themselves. Secure DOW applications running on commercial networks can benefit all parties. Such arrangements also allow DOW to take advantage of large commercial R&D budgets, which enhance the productivity of spectrum and create higher-performing devices.

Because these benefits await at the end of a successful implementation of the OBBBA’s spectrum provisions, DOW should be aggressively cooperative, seeking to beat the statutory deadlines and reduce its exclusive spectrum footprint as much as possible. That means studying more than just the bear minimum of spectrum for repurposing.

A good start would be rapid study of the 2.7 GHz, 4.4 GHz, and Lower 7 GHz bands. But DOW should do more preliminary work beyond that, for example, the entire 7 GHz band. Even if all this spectrum doesn’t shift to commercial use immediately, working proactively now means the policy process won’t need to go back to square one as conditions change. DOW should also use the most up-to-date and evidence-based modeling methods, making realistic assumptions and accounting for state-of-the-art interference mitigation techniques and sharing mechanisms. In short, DOW should push the frontier of spectrum technology, not being lag behind.

White House Leadership is Key

This shift in ethos must start from the top. President Trump must insist that the Department of War become higher tech, rather than letting old-fashioned systems and institutional inertia endanger our national security.

When President Trump signed the OBBBA, he set the agenda for aggressive American leadership on spectrum. He should demand that the DOW get on board with his vision, not be dragged along kicking and screaming. DOW should be an active collaborator to see how much spectrum can be repurposed for commercial use, not how little. It should be eager to beat the OBBBA’s deadlines and embrace the best evidence and modeling in conducting spectrum studies.

The opportunity cost of an inefficient spectrum status quo is less security, less wireless connectivity, and a dwindling role for U.S. diplomatic, technological, and economic leadership. The OBBBA takes a strong step toward reversing this situation, and it is in the interest of the executive branch to join that effort as willing volunteers, rapidly pushing for enhanced spectrum productivity, rather than clinging to today’s less safe, less productive spectrum allocations.