Contents

Introduction and Summary. 1

The Commission’s Methodology Should Seek To Maximize the Productivity of Satellite Spectrum.. 2

The Commission Should Evaluate the Degraded Throughput Threshold in Light of Probable Scenarios. 2

The Commission Should Consider an Aggregate Threshold That Is Divided Among Operational Systems in a Processing Round. 3

Conclusion. 3

Endnotes. 3

Introduction and Summary

The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation appreciates the opportunity to comment on the sharing rules for non-geostationary orbit (“NGSO”) fixed-satellite systems.[1] The Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“FNPRM” or “Further Notice”) asks questions important to the implementation of the Commission’s degraded throughput methodology for protection of earlier-round systems.[2]

The Commission’s Methodology Should Seek To Maximize the Productivity of Satellite Spectrum

The goal of spectrum policy should be to maximize the productivity of spectrum. Efficient management of interference is key to that goal, but the optimal level of interference is not zero. [3] The Commission’s adoption of a degraded throughput methodology recognizes this fact; allowing interference can be productive if the cost of mitigating it overprotects some users, making the spectrum far less usable.

In setting the degraded throughput threshold, therefore, the Commission should seek to facilitate maximum use of the spectrum, which entails not leaving productive interference (i.e. that which would reduce total output if we insisted it be mitigated) on the table.

The principle of spectrum productivity should also inform the Commission’s decision to adopt standardized antenna patterns. The degraded throughput methodology comes with the inherent risk of low-performing receivers experiencing degradation that receivers in better-designed systems would not. This dynamic could perversely incentivize satellite spectrum users not to invest in the resilience of their receivers because they can reduce costs and block future competitors by making their throughput unreasonably degradable. Such an outcome would create a kind of “hecklers’ veto” for spectrum in which the worst actor gets to block communications by others. The Commission should, therefore, adopt standardized antenna patterns that will receive Commission protection in order not to let unreasonably low-performing receivers be a basis for claiming high degraded throughput.[4]

Competition is also important to drive productivity rather than stagnation in satellite spectrum use. The long-term effects of these rules on competition are uncertain; it’s still early days for this industry and we don’t know who and what market structures will survive. The Commission should, therefore, not gerrymander its rules to favor or disfavor any particular deployment or planned deployment. Neutral regulatory structures in this proceeding that provide background rules against which parties can coordinate and negotiate can drive productive consensus among operators better than trying to resolve all issues through regulation.[5] Rules like the threat of 1/N spectrum splitting have shown the wisdom of Solomon in their ability to drive coordination without Commission micromanagement.[6]

The Commission Should Evaluate the Degraded Throughput Threshold in Light of Probable Scenarios

The Commission’s choice of a threshold of permissible degradation in throughput could have a momentous impact on the future development of the NGSO economy. Therefore, the Commission should consider this choice afresh based on the facts and record in this proceeding. A three percent threshold is a reasonable starting place for this analysis since it is already used in other satellite contexts.[7] At the same time, the Commission should recognize the distinct context of NGSO-NGSO interference and account for the unique technical and economic features of this market.

The Commission should also be mindful of different possible sources of interference and not minimize the potential threat of interference events by focusing only on in-line events. Though individual in-line events may be fleeting and involve few parties, side-lobe interference could be a significant source of degradation depending on the relative position of earth stations. In other words, the Commission should not conflate the small likelihood of multiple simultaneous in-line interference events with the total likelihood of harmful interference.

The Commission Should Consider an Aggregate Threshold That Is Divided Among Operational Systems in a Processing Round

The Commission should also match the real-world potential of its rules with the theoretical possibilities the interference environment in which NGSO constellations will operate. Two factors are in tension as the Commission considers whether to adopt an aggregate interference threshold.

First, most systems that were part of the prior processing round did not end up deploying. The Commission should not bind itself to an unrealistic assumption that all systems will deploy in determining the total degradation a priority system could experience. Second, the adoption of individual degraded-throughput thresholds without regard to their total potential effect leaves open the possibility that simultaneous degradation undermines the Commission’s overall policy of providing time-limited protection to earlier systems.

To balance these two phenomena, the Commission could adopt an aggregate threshold that is parceled out among later-round systems that actually deploy. If, for example, the Commission sets a 5 percent aggregate limit, the first system to deploy could degrade earlier-round systems by 5 percent until another later-round system deploys at which point both later-round systems would be able to degrade the earlier-round system by 2.5 percent each. After the third later-round system deploys each could degrade by 5/3 percent, and so on.

This proposal would require advanced planning in the design of later-round systems to either alter their plans as more systems deploy or plan to only cause degradation lower than would be permitted by Commission rules at the time of initial deployment. While such prediction and weighing of tradeoffs would be difficult, it is no more difficult than the Commission attempting to make the calculation of what level of aggregate interference would frustrate the public interest benefits of its rules. The main difference would be that satellite companies have greater access to the technical capabilities of their systems and a financial stake in getting in correctly predicting future market conditions.

Conclusion

The NGSO space economy is primed to take its place as a substantial contributor to broadband connectivity and other services. The Commission’s decisions in this proceeding will have durable impacts on the development of the space and broadband marketplace, so it must focus on setting a workable backdrop for coordination and negotiation that promotes productive use of satellite spectrum.

Endnotes