Publications: Stephen Ezell

Imposing blanket tariffs on U.S. semiconductor imports would imperil U.S. leadership across a broad range of digital and nondigital industries while significantly decreasing U.S. economic growth, raising prices, and jeopardizing broader U.S. manufacturing competitiveness.

The Trump administration’s call for “most favored nation” drug price controls will lead to less biopharmaceutical innovation and reduced U.S. drug industry competitiveness. However, the president’s willingness to use tariff negotiations to press other nations to pay their fair share for patented drugs is salutary.

The Trump administration’s “MFN” drug-price proposal would pose a far greater threat to U.S. biopharma innovation than the Inflation Reduction Act, because unlike the IRA’s selective list, MFN could apply across virtually every medicine, multiplying the deleterious impact.

As part of its deregulation efforts, the administration should clarify Bayh-Dole march-in rights; rescind NIH Access Planning Policy; rescind FRA two-person train crew requirements; clarify requirements for manually operated driving controls; protect America’s innovative clean-energy technologies; and streamline regulatory permitting for semiconductors.

Instead of blanket tariffs, America should focus first on persuading other nations to pay their fair share, and then on supporting public-private investments in novel technologies that will make U.S. pharmaceutical producers more innovative and cost-competitive.

The administration should focus foremost on addressing China’s mercantilist policies and resist the urge to impose blanket tariffs on U.S. imports of semiconductors, semiconductor inputs, or products with embedded semiconductors.

While the U.S. government is right to prevent U.S. companies from selling advanced AI technology to the Chinese military, cutting U.S. companies off from the entire Chinese market is a cure worse than the disease. It will ultimately harm both U.S. national security and economic interests.

ITIF offered comments on evidence the UK government should draw on; short- and long-term objectives for the UK-China relationship; areas to engage with China, and areas to draw red lines; how engagement could affect other alliances; and how to assess dependencies on China while strengthening security and resilience.

Globalization 1.0 has failed, but protectionist autarky cannot be its replacement. Instead, it is past time to craft a new kind of globalization that advances U.S. interests in key industries and prevents China from becoming the dominant techno-economic power.

The administration should address concerns related to counterfeit products, discriminatory digital taxes, and investment controls for critical technologies with measures to protect American innovation while promoting fair, rules-based trade principles that benefit the U.S. economy and support U.S. technological leadership.