Publications: Sejin Kim

The right goal for Korea is not an AI tax, but an AI diffusion strategy paired with sound tax reform. The government should help firms adopt AI, help workers transition, and make sure productivity gains are broadly shared, without making the use of AI itself more expensive.

South Korea produces large numbers of STEM graduates, but too many are attracted to medicine, and too few go into engineering. Korea should rebalance its education financing and university incentives to ensure that enough engineers are ready to work in advanced industries.

In the AI economy, competitive advantage will depend less on memorizing information and more on the ability to question intelligent systems, identify errors, and refine outputs. Korea’s education system should adapt to prepare students for workplaces where managing AI-generated mistakes is more valuable than speed of recall.

As Korea moves toward its goal of commercializing Level 4 autonomous driving by 2027, the central constraint may not be technological readiness but whether the government reforms the mobility market in advance. Without regulatory changes, Korea risks deploying advanced autonomous vehicles within a closed, taxi-centered system.

As Korea’s labor debate moves into digital policy, unions risk harming workers in the next generation of industries by prioritizing protections for existing jobs over preparing workers for technological transition.

Korea is unlocking high-quality data for AI but undermining that goal with a domestic server requirement that cuts developers off from global infrastructure. Targeted safeguards would do the job without the competitive cost.

Seventy percent of young Koreans hold university degrees. Only 14 percent of jobs are in large firms. The most immediate concern is not jobs disappearing due to AI, but that there are too few high-quality jobs in the first place.

While the Hyundai Motor case now sits at the center of Korea’s AI jobs debate, the evidence suggests that the nation’s more immediate constraints are weak productivity growth and uneven labor-market adjustment—not large-scale technological displacement. How Korea responds will shape its competitiveness in a high-cost, aging manufacturing economy under intensifying global competition.

The Trump administration’s tariff pressure reflects a transactional shift in U.S. trade policy, linking reciprocity to investment execution, regulatory predictability, and geopolitical alignment. Korea can adapt to this new playbook or absorb the economic consequences.

Cloud computing, artificial intelligence (AI)-based tools, digital advertising, e-commerce platforms and online human resources systems have become the most practical way smaller firms close the capability gap with larger competitors.