Publications: Sejin Kim

While the Hyundai Motor case now sits at the center of Korea’s AI jobs debate, the evidence suggests that the nation’s more immediate constraints are weak productivity growth and uneven labor-market adjustment—not large-scale technological displacement. How Korea responds will shape its competitiveness in a high-cost, aging manufacturing economy under intensifying global competition.

The Trump administration’s tariff pressure reflects a transactional shift in U.S. trade policy, linking reciprocity to investment execution, regulatory predictability, and geopolitical alignment. Korea can adapt to this new playbook or absorb the economic consequences.

Cloud computing, artificial intelligence (AI)-based tools, digital advertising, e-commerce platforms and online human resources systems have become the most practical way smaller firms close the capability gap with larger competitors.

If South Korea seeks a globally credible competition law framework, it should avoid implementing a model of digital antitrust regulation that is, in many ways, even more intrusive than the EU's Digital Markets Act.

Some Korean commentary misreads AGI as a threat to labor and a rationale for public compute. In reality, AGI is better understood as a productivity shock that expands economic output. Resetting the narrative is essential for Korea to pursue policies that strengthen private-sector capacity, support AI diffusion, and enhance innovation.

South Korea has quietly entered a new phase of its space ambitions. But to compete in the space economy, Seoul must focus on industrial design—not just technology. The real contest lies not in launch, but in satellite manufacturing, network infrastructure, data processing, and the services built atop them.

The joint U.S.–South Korea fact sheet makes clear that Seoul must move away from DMA-style platform regulations and uphold its pledge to ensure fair, non-discriminatory treatment of U.S. digital firms.

Korea cannot match the United States on foundational model innovation or China on manufacturing scale. But it holds a unique combination of strengths that neither possesses together: semiconductor fabrication, precision manufacturing, and world-class industrial robotics deployment.

As the KFTC enters its fifth decade, it is clear its mission must evolve—from control to credibility, and from compliance to competitiveness.

Democratic allies should co-invest, co-develop, and co-regulate emerging technologies instead of fragmenting digital markets. True leadership will come from joint strategies on export controls, standards, R&D, and talent—not sovereignty slogans.