Publications: Robert D. Atkinson

The U.S. government lacks adequate capabilities to conduct the kind of techno-economic industrial analysis that is necessary to avoid losing to China, nor is it organized to formulate and manage industrial and competitiveness strategies, policies, and programs in an enterprise-wide way. Policymakers must address these gaps to mobilize America’s economic power industries.

AI investment is booming, but manufacturing output is stagnant. America needs industrial policy to restore manufacturing and reduce dependence on China.

China embraces innovation. America gets in its own way. Conflicting rulebooks and resistance to technological adoption are helping China win and America lose.

Our brains are wired to react to uncertainty with fear before reason catches up. However, giving in to techno-doom panics is bad for humanity.

Japan was a competitor inside the U.S. alliance system. China is a rival trying to replace it. Waiting for China to repeat Japan’s slowdown is not a strategy.

The West held the ladder for the PRC, which is now trying to kick its competitors off the summit. If the United States wants any hope of regaining the top, it must start kicking away the PRC’s ladder by countering its unfair trade practices while building its own with a bold, robust national advanced industry strategy.

The U.S. regulatory state has become a major headwind for national economic power industries competing against China, and incremental reforms will not be enough for America to avoid techno-economic defeat. U.S. policymakers need to adopt a national developmentalist model.

If AI’s supposed “champions” don’t want people to be afraid, they should stop selling fear.

South Korea’s AI-memory boom proves that it can still lead at the technological frontier. The proposed Future Response Fund and national megaprojects will test whether South Korea can turn that lead into stronger suppliers, exportable capabilities, and allied scale before Chinese expansion narrows its industrial base.

Washington is now more focused on China but remains in denial about the threat. Fourteen rationalizations explain why its techno-economic response remains limited.