---
title: "Comments to the UK’s Department for Science, Innovation, & Technology Regarding Growing Up in the Online World"
summary: |-
  The UK should resist the urge to regulate in haste. Protecting children online is essential, but protection should mean smarter design, stronger safety tools, and greater parental control, not blanket bans that remove technology from young people and choice from families.
date: "2026-05-22"
issues: ["Internet", "Public Safety", "Privacy"]
authors: ["Ash Johnson", "Alex Ambrose"]
content_type: "Testimonies & Filings"
canonical_url: "https://itif.org/publications/2026/05/22/comments-uks-department-science-innovation-technology-growing-up-online-world/"
---

# Comments to the UK’s Department for Science, Innovation, & Technology Regarding Growing Up in the Online World

# Introduction and Summary

Every generation has faced various moral panic. Critics once blamed comic books, rock music, television, and video games for harming children.[1](#_edn1) Social media is the latest scapegoat, blamed for countless online and real-world harms, including negative mental-health outcomes. To that end, the House of Lords voted in favor of an amendment to the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill that would ban children under the age of 16 from using social media.[2](#_edn2) This proposal risks cutting off millions of teenagers from vital platforms for staying informed, finding community, and expressing themselves, while also threatening adults’ online anonymity and access. While policymakers should protect children online and address common causes of negative mental-health outcomes, the science simply does not support claims that social media itself is the root cause of these challenges.

Blanket social media bans are a sledgehammer response to a complex problem. The UK proposal would cut everyone under 16 off from all social media, including platforms that already provide robust safety tools, parental controls, and age-appropriate design. In doing so, the proposal treats all teenagers as equally vulnerable, all platforms as equally dangerous, and all parents as equally incapable of making decisions for their own families.

The goal may be child safety, but the result would be sweeping collateral damage. A ban would sever millions of teenagers from essential spaces for communication, creativity, civic engagement, and access to information, while doing little to address the real sources of harm online. In practice, bans don’t solve safety problems—they displace them. When lawful platforms are closed off, young users don’t disappear from the Internet; they migrate to harder-to-monitor spaces with fewer safeguards and less accountability. That makes children less safe, not more.

The proposal also creates serious downstream risks for adults. Enforcing a universal ban would require aggressive age-verification systems involving intrusive identity checks, threatening online anonymity and privacy for everyone, not just minors. The Online Safety Act has similar negative downstream effects, and this consultation should alert UK policymakers to chart a better path that preserves user privacy, limits collateral damage, and removes the incentives for online services to over-censor lawful content.[3](#_edn3)

The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) is a nonprofit, non-partisan public policy think tank based in Washington, D.C., committed to articulating and advancing pro-productivity, pro-innovation, and pro-technology public policy agendas around the world that spur growth, prosperity, and progress.

ITIF is pleased to submit the following comments to the consultation’s five chapters, with ITIF responding to the following questions via online submission. ITIF’s answers are copied below:

# Chapter One: Understanding How Children Use Technology

*What are the benefits of social media use, and being online, for children?*

Social media has many benefits for teens, including access to community, contact with distant friends and family, support for members of marginalized groups, entertainment, educational content, and political and social awareness. While some teens have overall negative experiences with social media, many have overall positive experiences. Policymakers should weigh both experiences equally and come up with solutions that maximize the benefits of social media for young people while minimizing the risks.

*What are the harms or risks of social media use, and being online, for children?*

There is inappropriate content or content that is potentially harmful to children on the Internet and on social media, just as there is in any form of media. This may include adult content, bullying, hate speech, and depictions or promotion of self-harm, suicide, eating disorders, substance abuse, or violence. Most of these forms of content violate most online services’ community guidelines, and most online services work diligently to remove harmful content. Online services that do allow adult content typically have restrictions in place meant to ensure only adult users seeking out such content are exposed to it or offer alternative versions of their services targeted at a younger audience.

*Do you think the benefits of children using social media, and being online, outweigh the risks, or the other way around?*

**i.** **Benefits strongly outweigh the risks**

ii. Benefits somewhat outweigh the risks

iii. Benefits and risks are roughly equal

iv. Risks somewhat outweigh the benefits

v. Risks strongly outweigh the benefits

vi. Don’t know/prefer not to answer

# Chapter Two: Interventions for Safer, More Positive Experiences

*There is no current legal requirement for social media services to have a minimum age of access, though many services set their minimum age policy at 13. A minimum age of access for a social media service would equate to a ban for anyone younger than the minimum age.*

*Would you support a legal requirement for social media services to have a minimum age of access?*

i. Yes

**ii.** **No**

iii. Don’t know/prefer not to answer

*What do you think the impacts would be of having a minimum age requirement higher than 13 for social media services?*

Age requirements will demand age verification in some form to ensure users under the age requirement cannot access the platform. In order to ensure children cannot lie about their age to gain access to social media, platforms would need to verify the ages of all users. This could include requiring all users to perform ID checks, turning over their personal information and forfeiting their anonymity.[4](#_edn4) This requirement would pose a barrier to adults who do not have government-issued forms of ID or are not willing to sacrifice their anonymity, which would likely disproportionately impact individuals from marginalized communities.

While there are less invasive ways to attempt to age-gate social media, such as privacy-protective digital IDs or age estimation powered by artificial intelligence (AI), no method of age verification is foolproof.[5](#_edn5) Teens could access their parents’ IDs, create their own fake IDs, use VPNs to evade location-specific social media bans, or convince their parents to set up an account on their behalf. Children may also move from social media to less safe and less age-appropriate online spaces.

*Under UK GDPR, “information society services” often need to seek consent to use people’s data for activities such as profiling for advertising purposes. Information society services that are provided for commercial purposes, including websites, apps, online gaming, social media, search engines, online marketplaces, etc. Children can only give their consent for their data to be used for such purposes if they are 13 or above. For children under this age, services are required to make reasonable efforts to verify consent from those with parental responsibility.*

*At what age do you think the age of digital consent in the UK should be set for information society services?*

**i.** **13**

ii. 14

iii. 15

iv. 16

v. Don’t know/prefer not to answer

vi. Other

*What risks or burdens may be associated with raising the minimum age of digital consent?*

Raising the age of digital consent would increase the cost and complexity of compliance, as verifying parental consent is costly for companies and inconvenient for parents. It would also lead to lower revenue for information society services that offer services aimed at a teenage audience, thus disincentivizing companies from creating and maintaining age-appropriate services for teenagers.

*To what extend do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “There is a case for changing the digital age of consent for some online services but not others.” Please explain the reasoning behind your answer.*

i. Strongly agree

ii. Somewhat agree

iii. Neither agree nor disagree

iv. Somewhat disagree

**v.** **Strongly disagree**

vi. Don’t know/prefer not to answer

*“Functionality” refers to a feature of a service which enables interactions or actions between its users. This includes a range of capabilities that services offer. Some online services allow their users to engage with the following functionalities. Do you think these functionalities should be age restricted so that children below a certain age cannot engage with them? Please select all that apply:*

i. Live streaming

**ii.** **Ability to send nude images or videos**

iii. Disappearing content

iv. Location sharing

v. Connecting or talking to strangers

vi. Don’t know/prefer not to answer

vii. None of the above

viii. Other

*To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Restricting children’s access to these features/functionalities, would provide a safer online experience for children? Features/functionalities include live streaming, the ability to send nude images or videos, disappearing content, location sharing, and connecting or talking to strangers.*

i. Strongly agree

ii. Somewhat agree

iii. Neither agree nor disagree

iv. Somewhat disagree

v. Strongly disagree

**vi.** **Don’t know/prefer not to answer**

*What do you think the impacts would be if some online services were required to introduce age restrictions on specific features and functionalities?*

A patchwork of multiple requirements across platforms costs more, is more confusing for parents, and creates more compliance challenges. In addition, creating age restrictions for certain features and not others leads to users’ age verification information being stored in multiple points across multiple platforms, raising security concerns.

Keeping children safe—online or offline—should involve protecting them within those activities, not banning certain age groups from those activities altogether. Swimming, driving, sports, playgrounds, video games, and traditional media all carry some risk, yet they also deliver real benefits: entertainment, convenience, social connection, and the health gains that come with physical activity. We don't ban children from these things simply because danger exists; we manage the risk. The same logic should apply to social media.[6](#_edn6) Children draw genuine value from it—learning, staying connected with friends and family, and having fun—so the goal should be making their experiences safer, not eliminating them.

A more effective approach involves device-level parental controls that create an opt-in “trustworthy child flag” for user accounts, available when first setting up a device and later in a device’s settings, that signals to apps and websites that a user is underage and requiring apps and websites that serve age-restricted content to check for this signal for their users and block underage users from this content. The UK should formalize this approach to give parents more control over their children's online experience, avoid any impact on adult access to legal content online, and sidestep the privacy and security risks of age verification.[7](#_edn7)

*The following design features are sometimes known as “persuasive,” meaning they may encourage children to stay online for longer. From the following list, please select the ones you think are particularly “persuasive” to children. Please select all that apply:*

i. Infinite scrolling

ii. Autoplay

iii. Affirmation features (e.g. likes, comments)

iv. Alerts and push notifications

v. Content recommendation algorithms (these are algorithms which provide personalized recommendations on a user’s feed)

vi. Don’t know/prefer not to answer

vii. None of the above

**viii.** **Other**

One-size-fits-all policies are ineffective, as the types of content children should have access to varies significantly from child to child.[8](#_edn8) What could be considered “persuasive” for one child could be considered beneficial or useful for another. Ensuring design features such as autoplay, alerts, and affirmation features are customizable and available for parents to tailor to their own child’s experience is key to balancing safety for all types of young users.

*Which of these features do you think should be age restricted? Please select all that apply:*

i. Infinite scrolling

ii. Autoplay

iii. Affirmation features (e.g. likes, comments)

iv. Alerts and push notifications

v. Content recommendation algorithms (these are algorithms which provide personalized recommendations on a user’s feed)

vi. Don’t know/prefer not to answer

**vii.** **None of the above—they should not be age restricted**

viii. Other

*Would you support the following restrictions for children’s access to online services?*

i. Daily screen time limits for individual apps

ii. Restricting overnight access for individual apps

iii. Both—daily screen time limits and overnight access for individual apps

**iv.** **I would not support either of them**

v. Don’t know/prefer not to answer

*What do you think the impacts would be if online platforms were required to restrict specific features or functionalities, or to introduce time limits?*

Time-limit policies stem from a flawed but prevailing narrative that social media is inherently addictive, particularly for young users, and therefore youth need strict limits to their time online. But the research does not support such sweeping conclusions. While excessive or problematic use can certainly be harmful for some individuals, much of the existing research relies on correlational data or self-reported screen time data, which makes it difficult to draw clear causal links between usage duration and mental-health outcomes. Research from theDigital Wellness Lab at Boston Children’s Hospital and Harvard Medical Schoolin2024finds that excessive time spent playing video games, using social media, and using smartphones is typically a coping mechanism for psychological issues, rather than the cause of them.[9](#_edn9)

Furthermore, most platforms and operating systems already have parental controls that parents can use to set time limits, customized to what that child and family find works best for them. For example, how do government-mandated policies account for homeschooled students who may be using platforms for educational reasons outside of traditional school hours? What about children in hospitals or traveling on vacation with their families?

Blunt time-limit mandates do not meaningfully improve youth safety online. Treating every young user as the same through one-size-fits-all policies is ineffective, as children do not automatically reach certain cognitive, emotional, and social thresholds as soon as they hit a particular birthday ormaturity level, and the types of content children should have access to and for how long can vary significantly from child to child. A more productive approach would be for policymakers to focus on helping parents understand and use the tools already available to them. Confusing this pre-existing process for parents and muddying compliance for platforms is the wrong approach to protecting youth from social-media harms.[10](#_edn10)

*What factors are important when determining which apps, sites, or services to apply minimum age of access restrictions to?*

Age-of-access restrictions should be limited to content that is clearly harmful to children, such as adult or sexual content. However, defining what constitutes as “harmful to children” is challenging.

While some material is clearly harmful, other content might cause harm to some minors while benefitting others. At the same time, certain content that, on the surface, falls within categories of harmful content may, in fact, prove beneficial. Promotion of violent behavior is very different from a news broadcast depicting violent behavior, but both contain violent content. Informational resources about eating disorders are very different from content that encourages disordered eating, but both cover the same topic. Moreover, different families from different backgrounds, cultures, or belief systems may disagree about the levels of harm different subjects pose to their children. Finally, some content may be appropriate for older teenagers but not younger teenagers, and there is no set age at which each child becomes “mature enough” to handle certain sensitive topics.

Due to all these factors and more, vague language is vulnerable to misuse and could lead to further legal challenges. Additionally, nearly every major social media platform hosts sexual content in some form, whether intentional and explicit, like adult content allowed on X and Reddit, or unintentional and suggestive content found on Instagram.[11](#_edn11) Government-mandated content restrictions, therefore, carry inherent threats to free speech and free access to information and should carefully target content that the majority of reasonable people would agree is harmful to children.

*Are there any types of apps, sites, or services that you want to be captured by minimum age of access restrictions?*

Services that primarily provide or heavily feature adult content.

*What are the benefits to children using AI chatbots?*

One of the largest benefits for children and chatbots is for learning. Students can use AI tutors to deliver judgement-free academic support personally tailored to the student’s unique learning style and pace. Parents and teachers can inspire curiosity and creativity by encouraging children to use AI to ask questions about the world and generate ideas for creative projects. Additionally, AI companions can provide a low-risk, judgment-free space for children to practice communication and social skills, helping them expand their vocabulary and develop critical reading and writing abilities.

Similarly, chatbots can play a role in identity formation for children and adolescents. They present an avenue for users to try out different aspects of their personality that they may not feel comfortable displaying openly in real life, and can provide a “safe forum” for this sort of exploration.[12](#_edn12) Chatbots and AI companions can also serve therapeutic purposes, helping users process emotions, identify patterns in their thinking processes, and find healthy coping strategies. AI companions are available 24/7 for support, including times when vulnerable or lonely users may not be able to talk to a real-life friend or family member.

Some young users may form one-sided emotional attachments or “parasocial relationships” to AI chatbots if designed poorly or if those users are predisposed to forming those attachments due to other real-world factors. However, AI companions and chatbots are not inherently detrimental to social well-being.[13](#_edn13)

*Which AI chatbot features are most risky for children?*

i. The realism of interactions, including realism of content generated

ii. The personalization of interactions

iii. How they mimic relationships (friendship)

**iv.** **How they mimic relationships (romantic)**

v. How they mimic empathy

vi. Flattering language

vii. Features to encourage more questions/requests (e.g. asking questions back)

viii. The ability to recall interactions across sessions

ix. The type of content generated—a) video, b) text, c) audio, d) image

x. Allowing children to have accounts

**xi.** Hallucination or false, misleading responses

**xii.** **Ability to engage in and generate mature content (e.g. sexual/romantic roleplay)**

xiii. Don’t know/prefer not to answer

xiv. None of the above/AI chatbot features are not risky for children

xv. Other

*Which functionalities of AI chatbots should minimum age restrictions apply to?*

It should be up to parents to determine which functionalities they would restrict for their child, which could include any of the above features. As is the case with social media, when it comes to chatbot policies, the types of content children and youth should have access to varies significantly from child to child.[14](#_edn14) What could be “risky” for one child could be beneficial for another. Overly sexual, violent, or suicidal content is clearly harmful for all youth, but exploring certain aspects of sexuality, learning about significant real-world events that involve violence, or gaining information about mental-health topics is not inherently harmful.

*Should AI chatbots have minimum age restrictions?*

i. Yes—minimum age restrictions for AI chatbots

ii. Yes—restrict access to certain features and functionalities

iii. Yes—both minimum age requirements and restricting access to certain features and functionalities

**iv.** **No**

v. Don’t know/prefer not to answer

*Please explain the reasoning behind your answer.*

No, AI chatbots are not inherently risky and should not be age restricted. Instead, there should be parental controls and the ability to restrict certain functionalities if the parent chooses. Chatbots can be a useful education tool, and blanket restrictions are not the answer. Children should not be able to engage with obscene or violent content through a chatbot, but those restrictions should be enforced through proper parental controls. Major chatbot platforms like ChatGPT and Gemini already require users to be over the age of 13 based on the platforms’ terms of service, while Claude requires users to be over 18.

*What do you think the impact would be of introducing age restrictions on AI chatbots or certain features and functions?*

The pitfalls of age verification for social media would be the same for chatbots.

# Chapter Three: Enforcement and Compliance

*To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Adults should complete age checks more often, if it means children are safer online.”*

i. Strongly agree

ii. Somewhat agree

iii. Neither agree nor disagree

iv. Somewhat disagree

**v.** **Strongly disagree**

vi. Don’t know/prefer not to answer

*What should be considered to make minimum age restrictions effective and workable?*

To avoid a patchwork of multiple compliance requirements across platforms, a more effective approach involves device-level parental controls that create an opt-in “trustworthy child flag” for user accounts, available when first setting up a device and later in a device’s settings, that signals to apps and websites that a user is underage and requiring apps and websites that serve age-restricted content to check for this signal for their users and block underage users from this content. The UK should formalize this approach to give parents more control over their children's online experience, avoid any impact on adult access to legal content online, and sidestep the privacy and security risks of age verification.[15](#_edn15)

*What do you think the impacts might be from requiring age assurance across a greater number of online platforms?*

A patchwork of multiple requirements across platforms costs more, is more confusing for parents, and creates more compliance challenges for platforms. In addition, creating age restrictions for certain features and not others leads to users’ age verification information being stored in multiple points across multiple platforms, raising security concerns should that information be leaked or hacked.

*How, if it all, could age assurance be made more effective?*

The most effective method for age verification is at the device level, not the app, platform, or app-store level. Regulations should allow platforms to assume everyone is an adult unless they have been marked as a child, a process that should be easy and accessible. This could be done through a “child flag” in a device’s operating system that allows parents to a device as one being used by a minor. Websites and apps that deliver age-restricted content could then check whether a device or account on a device has received the flag and, if called for, block a user from seeing the content. By implementing this opt-in, largely voluntary system, users would not face the same disruptions caused by a blanket age-gate mandate.[16](#_edn16)

*What should be considered when assessing the effectiveness of age verification and age-assurance technologies?*

There are multiple different ways online services can verify users’ ages, and each of these methods comes with different strengths and weaknesses. Some are more accurate but more invasive, whereas others are less invasive but also less accurate. Before the passage of any age verification laws, many online services, including adult websites and social media platforms, required users to either check a box indicating they are over a certain age or input their date of birth to confirm they are over a certain age. This form of self-verification is the least invasive, because it only requires users to disclose, at most, one piece of personal information: their date of birth. Because many people can share the same birthday, this piece of information cannot uniquely identify an individual. However, this method is also the least reliable, as underage users can and often do lie about their age in order to gain access to certain online services.

On the other end of the spectrum when it comes to accuracy and invasiveness is the ID check. This form of age verification is common in physical spaces, such as bars, casinos, and liquor stores, where customers must provide a valid government-issued ID in order to prove they are above the minimum age required to enter an age-gated space or purchase an age-gated product. It is also highly accurate, as government-issued IDs are more difficult to falsify than checking a box or entering one’s date of birth. However, because bars, casinos, and liquor stores do not store a copy of each customer’s ID, these in-person ID checks pose lower privacy risks than do online ID checks, where an online service may store the information from users’ IDs, including their full name, gender, home address, and photograph.

This data collection would pose privacy risks that may deter some users from participating in certain online activity, particularly users who value their anonymity, which often includes members of vulnerable populations.[17](#_edn17) Age verification could also bar those without a form of government-issued ID from using certain online services.

*Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) are tools that create a secure private connection between your device and the Internet. They are used for several purposes, such as protecting sensitive communications and protecting privacy, including in a corporate context. What methods to circumvent online safety rules do you think children in the UK use, beyond Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), or similar technologies?*

In addition to using VPNs, children can simply switch between their accounts and an adult’s account, such as one belonging to a parent or other relative, or use an adult’s device or shared family device.

*Which of the options below do you think the government should prioritize to reduce circumvention of online safety rules in the UK?*

**i.** **More education for children**

ii. Restricting children’s access to VPNs

iii. None of the above

iv. Don’t know/prefer not to answer

v. Other

*To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Everyone should go through age checks to access a VPN if it would prevent children using them.”*

i. Strongly agree

ii. Somewhat agree

iii. Neither agree nor disagree

iv. Somewhat disagree

**v.** **Strongly disagree**

vi. Don’t know/prefer not to answer

*What do you think the impacts would be if VPNs were age-restricted?*

The day after the Online Safety Act went into effect, half of the top ten app downloads in the UK were for VPNs or identity verification apps. One of these apps, Proton VPN, claims sign-ups surged by more than 1,400 percent minutes after the law went into effect.[18](#_edn18)

If the UK restricts VPN usage, based on past bans in the U.S. and the current ban in Australia, children will flock to less safe platforms. When users decide to use a VPN in order to access blocked Internet services, this demonstrates the services have value. As a result, policies that block access to VPNs reduce both the openness of the Internet and its value.[19](#_edn19)

Better parental controls would achieve the intended outcome of protecting children from harmful content, while preserving the free and open Internet for all users.

*In February 2026, the Department of Education updated the guidance on mobile phones in schools and stipulated that all schools should be mobile phone-free environments by default unless there is a good reason for phones to be in use. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “To address some of the challenges schools face with mobile phones, the Department of Education’s non-statutory guidance on ‘mobile phones in schools’ should be made statutory.” This would mean schools have a legal duty to follow the guidance, which explains to individual schools and trusts how to implement a policy that prohibits the use of mobile phones throughout the school day, unless they have a good reasons not to. This includes during lessons, the time between lessons, breaktimes, and lunchtime.*

i. Strongly agree

ii. Somewhat agree

iii. Neither agree nor disagree

iv. Somewhat disagree

**v.** **Strongly disagree**

vi. Don’t know/prefer not to answer

*Are there specific circumstances where you think children should be permitted to have or use a mobile phone during the school day? Please select all that apply:*

**i.** **Medical needs**

**ii.** **Special Educational Needs and Disabilities (SEND) requirements**

**iii.** **Individual safeguarding concerns**

**iv.** **Caring responsibilities**

**v.** **Educational or learning purposes**

**vi.** **Travel to and from school**

vii. Don’t know/prefer not to answer

viii. None of the above, children should not be permitted to have or use a mobile phone during the school day at all

ix. None of the above, children should always be permitted to have or use a mobile phone during the school day

x. Other

# Chapter Four: Preparing Children for a Digital Future

*Media literacy is about understanding, questioning, and making sense of the content you see online. It helps children tell the difference between fact and opinion, check sources, and assess their trustworthiness, and recognize how online content can affect thoughts, feelings, and behavior. Digital literacy means having the practical skills to use devices and online services safely, confidently, and independently. This includes knowing how to set up and use devices, recognizing scams, protecting personal information, and managing everyday digital tasks.*

*Which areas of media or digital literacy do children and families most need additional help with? Please select all that apply:*

**i.** **Managing screen time and online habits**

**ii.** **Spotting adverts, sponsored posts, or AI generated content**

**iii.** **Keeping personal information private**

**iv.** **Online behavior and experiences (bullying, respect, comparison, or peer pressure)**

**v.** **Checking if information is true**

**vi.** **Understanding how social media works (for example, likes or algorithms)**

**vii.** **Staying safe online (including how to have conversations about online safety)**

**viii.** **Reporting harmful or upsetting content**

ix. Knowing which apps or sites are right for their age

x. Don’t know/prefer not to answer

xi. None of the above

*Where, if anywhere, would you like to see more support available in the future? Please select all that apply:*

**i.** **Schools or childcare settings**

**ii.** **Community or youth spaces (for example libraries, youth clubs, or local charities)**

**iii.** **Parent or carer groups or networks**

**iv.** **Public services (such as family hubs, GP surgeries, or community centres)**

**v.** **Faith or cultural groups**

**vi.** **Non-governmental online sources (such as websites, platforms, or online communities)**

**vii.** **Government websites**

viii. Don’t know/prefer not to answer

ix. None of the above/I would not use these to find help

x. Other

*Outside of schools, how could the UK government better support children and young people to stay safe and feel supported online? Please select all that apply:*

**i.** **By providing clear guidance that children can use on their own**

**ii.** **By supporting parents and carers to support children online**

**iii.** **By working with online platforms and services that children already use**

**iv.** **By supporting youth organizations and community groups to help children online**

**v.** **By making help or advice easy to access when something goes wrong online**

**vi.** **By involving children and young people in designing support**

vii. Don’t know/prefer not to answer

viii. None of the above

*What types of support would help children with additional needs stay safe online and build digital skills? (By “additional needs,” we mean children who may need extra support for a range of reasons, such as learning, communication, health, or access needs.) Please select all that apply:*

**i.** **Clear, simple information using plain language**

**ii.** **Content adapted for different ages, abilities, or needs**

**iii.** **Visual, audio, or interactive formats**

**iv.** **Support delivered through trusted local or community services**

**v.** **Flexible or on-demand support that can be accessed when needed**

**vi.** **Support that helps parents or carers guide children online**

vii. Don’t know/prefer not to answer

viii. None of the above

ix. Other

*We know that access to high quality content can be beneficial for children. By “high quality” online content, we mean content that can have positive impacts on children’s learning and development. Who would you trust to determine what is meant by “high quality online content” for children 13-16? Please select all that apply:*

i. Government

**ii.** **Online platform trust and safety teams**

**iii.** **Parents, carers, or trusted adults**

**iv.** **Children**

**v.** **Developmental experts**

**vi.** **Educators**

**vii.** **Youth workers**

viii. Child advocacy charities and organizations

ix. Don’t know/prefer not to answer

x. None of the above

xi. Other

*What further action should be prioritized to support positive online spaces for young people? Please select all that apply:*

**i.** **Develop best practice principles for industry**

**ii.** **Develop guidance for parents and carers**

**iii.** **Develop guidance for children**

iv. Reviewing international approaches

**v.** **Industry voluntarily promoting high quality content for children**

vi. Don’t know/prefer not to answer

vii. None of the above

viii. Other

# Chapter Five: Supporting Families

*Many online platforms provide parental control tools which allow parents and carers to oversee and place parameters around children’s online activity, including content, time, and functionality-based restrictions.*

*To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Parents should have control over their online experiences of their children.”*

**i.** **Strongly agree**

ii. Somewhat agree

iii. Neither agree nor disagree

iv. Somewhat disagree

v. Strongly disagree

vi. Don’t know/prefer not to answer

*Please explain the reasoning behind your answer.*

Most parents would object to the government dictating how they raise their children. Regulation can set guardrails that aim to prevent concrete harms and provide new tools for user safety, but some amount of parental control is necessary because every child is different. In most cases, parents will understand their own child’s unique needs better than the government will.

At the same time, not every child lives in a home with parents willing or able to look out for their best interests online. Even parents who have the time and skills to monitor their children’s use need tools to make that easier or, in some cases, possible.[20](#_edn20)

*How should this level of control change for children of different ages?*

Blanket bans on certain features and platforms and one-size-fits-all policies are ineffective, as children do not automatically reach certain cognitive, emotional, and social thresholds as soon as they reach a particular birthday, and the types of content children should have access to can vary significantly from child to child.[21](#_edn21) Children’s independence and autonomy over their own online experiences should grow as they get older, just as their understanding of privacy grows as they get older, but parents are better positioned to gauge this growth than government mandates.

*What would help parents and carers to more effectively use parental controls? (For example, more information on how to do this on purchase of a phone, help from platforms on how to set up, or greater standardization across tools.)*

According to a Family Online Safety Institute (FOSI) study, only 47 percent of parents utilize parental controls.[22](#_edn22) Many parents underutilize these tools because they are either too time-consuming or too difficult to figure out. ITIF has long advocated for a government-led forum to create a voluntary industry standard for interoperability on cross-platform parental controls, which would enable parents to create universal limits on their children’s online behavior across multiple devices.[23](#_edn23) Greater standardization across tools will make it easier for parents—especially technologically illiterate parents—to better navigate all parental controls across platforms. Furthermore, digital-literacy programs should include guidance for parents to understand and use parental controls more effectively.

# Conclusion

The UK should resist the urge to regulate in haste.[24](#_edn24) Its consultation process exists for a reason: to allow educators, parents, researchers, platforms, and child-safety experts to weigh in before irreversible policy choices are made. Protecting children online is essential, but protection should mean smarter design, stronger safety tools, and greater parental control, not blanket bans that remove technology from young people and choice from families. The UK’s approach to online harms to children should remain grounded in thoughtful, child-centered policy, not panic-driven policymaking.

Thank you for your consideration.

# Endnotes

[1](#_ednref1) Ash Johnson, “Social Media Panic Is the New Video Game Panic,” (ITIF, January 26, 2024), [https://itif.org/publications/2024/01/26/social-media-panic-is-the-new-video-game-panic/](https://itif.org/publications/2024/01/26/social-media-panic-is-the-new-video-game-panic/)

[2](#_ednref2) Paul Seddon, “Lords back UK social media ban for under-16s,” *BBC*, January 21, 2026, [https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz0pnekxpn8o](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz0pnekxpn8o)

[3](#_ednref3) Daniel Castro and Alex Ambrose, “The UK’s Online Safety Act’s Predictable Consequences Are a Cautionary Tale for America,” (ITIF, September 3, 2025), [https://itif.org/publications/2025/09/03/the-uks-online-safety-acts-predictable-consequences-are-cautionary-tale-for-the-us/](https://itif.org/publications/2025/09/03/the-uks-online-safety-acts-predictable-consequences-are-cautionary-tale-for-the-us/)

[4](#_ednref4) Ash Johnson, “Banning Teens from Social Media Isn’t Protection, It’s Overreach,” (ITIF, October 6, 2025), [https://itif.org/publications/2025/10/06/banning-teens-from-social-media-isnt-protection-its-overreach/](https://itif.org/publications/2025/10/06/banning-teens-from-social-media-isnt-protection-its-overreach/)

[5](#_ednref5) Ash Johnson, “AI Could Make Age Verification More Accurate and Less Invasive,” (ITIF, April 5, 2023), [https://itif.org/publications/2023/04/05/ai-could-make-age-verification-more-accurate-and-less-invasive/](https://itif.org/publications/2023/04/05/ai-could-make-age-verification-more-accurate-and-less-invasive/)

[6](#_ednref6) Ash Johnson, “Why Not Ban Everything Potentially Dangerous for Kids?,” (ITIF, February 16, 2024), [https://itif.org/publications/2024/02/16/why-not-ban-everything-potentially-dangerous-for-kids/](https://itif.org/publications/2024/02/16/why-not-ban-everything-potentially-dangerous-for-kids/)

[7](#_ednref7) “To Do: Establish a “Child Flag” System for Age-Restricted Content,” ITIF, [https://itif.org/publications/2024/06/03/to-do-establish-a-child-flag-system-for-age-restricted-content/](https://itif.org/publications/2024/06/03/to-do-establish-a-child-flag-system-for-age-restricted-content/)

[8](#_ednref8) Alex Ambrose, “The Flawed Narrative Driving Tech Bans for Kids,” (ITIF, February 19, 2026), [https://itif.org/publications/2026/02/19/the-flawed-narrative-driving-tech-bans-for-kids/](https://itif.org/publications/2026/02/19/the-flawed-narrative-driving-tech-bans-for-kids/)

[9](#_ednref9) [https://digitalwellnesslab.org/cimaid/](https://digitalwellnesslab.org/cimaid/)

[10](#_ednref10) Alex Ambrose, “Calling Timeout on Social Media Time Limit Policies,” (ITIF, April 8, 2026), [https://itif.org/publications/2026/04/08/calling-timeout-on-social-media-time-limit-policies/](https://itif.org/publications/2026/04/08/calling-timeout-on-social-media-time-limit-policies/)

[11](#_ednref11) Alex Ambrose, “Congress, Not States or the Supreme Court, Should Lead the Way in Balancing Children’s Online Safety and Access to Adult Content,” (ITIF, February 5, 2025), [https://itif.org/publications/2025/02/05/congress-should-lead-way-in-childrens-online-safety-access-adult-content/](https://itif.org/publications/2025/02/05/congress-should-lead-way-in-childrens-online-safety-access-adult-content/)

[12](#_ednref12) Tracy R. Gleason et al., “Parasocial Interactions and Relationships in Early Adolescence,” *Frontiers in Psychology*, February 23, 2017, [https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5322191/](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5322191/)

[13](#_ednref13) Hodan Omaar and Daniel Castro, “Picking the Right Policy Solutions for AI Concerns,” (Center for Data Innovation, May 20, 2024), [https://www2.datainnovation.org/2024-ai-policy-solutions.pdf](https://www2.datainnovation.org/2024-ai-policy-solutions.pdf); Alex Ambrose, “Policymakers Should Further Study the Benefits and Risks of AI Companions,” (ITIF, November 18, 2024), [https://itif.org/publications/2024/11/18/policymakers-should-further-study-the-benefits-risks-of-ai-companions/](https://itif.org/publications/2024/11/18/policymakers-should-further-study-the-benefits-risks-of-ai-companions/)

[14](#_ednref14) Alex Ambrose, “The Flawed Narrative Driving Tech Bans for Kids,” (ITIF, February 19, 2026), [https://itif.org/publications/2026/02/19/the-flawed-narrative-driving-tech-bans-for-kids/](https://itif.org/publications/2026/02/19/the-flawed-narrative-driving-tech-bans-for-kids/)

[15](#_ednref15) “To Do: Establish a “Child Flag” System for Age-Restricted Content,” ITIF, [https://itif.org/publications/2024/06/03/to-do-establish-a-child-flag-system-for-age-restricted-content/](https://itif.org/publications/2024/06/03/to-do-establish-a-child-flag-system-for-age-restricted-content/)

[16](#_ednref16) Ibid.

[17](#_ednref17) Ash Johnson, “Lacking a Federal Standard, States Try and Fail to Solve Problems Faced by Kids Online,” (ITIF, November 17, 2023), [https://itif.org/publications/2023/11/17/lacking-a-federal-standard-states-try-and-fail-to-solve-problems-faced-by-kids-online/](https://itif.org/publications/2023/11/17/lacking-a-federal-standard-states-try-and-fail-to-solve-problems-faced-by-kids-online/)

[18](#_ednref18) Daniel Castro and Alex Ambrose, “The UK’s Online Safety Act’s Predictable Consequences Are a Cautionary Tale for America,” (ITIF, September 3, 2025), [https://itif.org/publications/2025/09/03/the-uks-online-safety-acts-predictable-consequences-are-cautionary-tale-for-the-us/](https://itif.org/publications/2025/09/03/the-uks-online-safety-acts-predictable-consequences-are-cautionary-tale-for-the-us/)

[19](#_ednref19) Michael McLaughlin and Daniel Castro, “The Case for a Mostly Open Internet,” (ITIF, December 19, 2019), [https://itif.org/publications/2019/12/16/case-mostly-open-internet/](https://itif.org/publications/2019/12/16/case-mostly-open-internet/)

[20](#_ednref20) Ash Johnson, “How to Address Children’s Online Safety in the United States,” (ITIF, June 3, 2024), [https://itif.org/publications/2024/06/03/how-to-address-childrens-online-safety-in-united-states/](https://itif.org/publications/2024/06/03/how-to-address-childrens-online-safety-in-united-states/)

[21](#_ednref21) Alex Ambrose, “The Flawed Narrative Driving Tech Bans for Kids,” (ITIF, February 19, 2026), [https://itif.org/publications/2026/02/19/the-flawed-narrative-driving-tech-bans-for-kids/](https://itif.org/publications/2026/02/19/the-flawed-narrative-driving-tech-bans-for-kids/)

[22](#_ednref22) “Connected and Protected: Insights from FOSI’s 2025 Online Safety Survey,” FOSI, May 28, 2025, [https://fosi.org/research/connected-and-protected-insights-from-fosis-2025-online-safety-survey/](https://fosi.org/research/connected-and-protected-insights-from-fosis-2025-online-safety-survey/)

[23](#_ednref23) “To Do: Make Parental Controls Interoperable,” ITIF, [https://itif.org/publications/2024/06/03/to-do-make-parental-controls-interoperable/](https://itif.org/publications/2024/06/03/to-do-make-parental-controls-interoperable/)

[24](#_ednref24) Alex Ambrose, “Protecting Children Online in the UK Requires Smarter Tools, Not Blanket Bans,” (ITIF, January 23, 2026), [https://itif.org/publications/2026/01/23/protecting-children-online-in-the-uk-requires-smarter-tools-not-blanket-bans/](https://itif.org/publications/2026/01/23/protecting-children-online-in-the-uk-requires-smarter-tools-not-blanket-bans/)

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*Source: Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF)*
*URL: https://itif.org/publications/2026/05/22/comments-uks-department-science-innovation-technology-growing-up-online-world/*