Publications: Joseph V. Coniglio

The ruling against Google in the ad tech case has been heralded as a straightforward effort to hold Big Tech accountable. But in reality, the mixed decision is a regrettable misstep that rests on shaky legal foundations and risks severe knock-on consequences for innovation.

The prevailing left and right populisms—neo-Brandeisian and national conservatism—do not present desirable models for grounding the next generation of U.S. antitrust law and share important key flaws.

How I learned to stop worrying and love the AI revolution.

AI provides no reason at this time for either heavy-handed enforcement of our antitrust laws or fundamental changes to them. The right approach is to maintain antitrust law’s traditional focus on promoting competition and innovation by proscribing collusive and exclusionary anticompetitive conduct.

Rather than adopt the European Union’s model for regulating competition, policymakers considering how to govern digital markets should carefully evaluate whether digital antitrust regulation is justified and consider whether concerns about anticompetitive behavior can be addressed with less intrusive and more cost-effective tools.

By deciding not to pursue digital competition regulation, Australia can avoid the problems that are already materializing as a result of ex-ante regimes like the EU’s DMA.

The possibility of a new bipartisan consensus based on the Biden administration’s failed merger policies should concern Senate Republicans.

While ITIF commends the MBIE for analyzing the efficacy of its current regime, substantial changes to New Zealand’s competition laws should be a response to clear market failures that improves consumer welfare, and not merely an attempt to keep up with perceived global or regional trends.

Neo-Brandeisian antitrust will not form the basis of a new bipartisan antitrust consensus.

Instead of treating Apple as a public utility, the Commission should work to ensure that interoperability requirements align with the broader theoretical framework that orients European competition policy, such as condemning unilateral conduct that may harm rivals only when it does not constitute competition on the merits.