Publications: Giorgio Castiglia

Post-deal layoffs and price increases do not prove that an acquisition harmed competition, contrary to the recent rhetoric around the Microsoft/Activision deal.

Economic evidence continues to show positive effects of firm size on innovation. Scale matters for innovation and economic growth, and antitrust policy should not be constrained by the “big is bad” notions of today’s antitrust populists.

Antitrust policy relies too heavily on static models that focus on prices and market shares while treating innovation as external. A dynamic approach that views competition as a process of innovation is better suited to guiding policy in today’s technology-driven economy.

Populists on the right and left continue to peddle myths about the U.S. technology industry and its “Big Tech” firms. Five persistent myths in particular risk spurring regulations that would stifle innovation, slow growth, and weaken U.S. competitiveness.

The recent trial in FTC v. Meta shows the important role that economic experiments can play in establishing a relevant market in antitrust cases. The evidence provided by Meta’s expert economists significantly hampers the FTC’s definition of the relevant market and thus its overall case.

Giorgio Castiglia appeared on the Technocracy podcast, hosted by Heena Goswami of the Institute for Governance, Policies & Politics, to discuss whether the United States is moving toward a tech oligarchy and what that would mean for the future of democracy.

While U.S. antitrust enforcement is likely to shift under a second Trump administration, ongoing cases against Big Tech are expected to continue. Rather than doubling down on neo-Brandeisian antitrust, the Trump administration should use evidence-based policymaking that recognizes how firms evolve in response to incentives and market dynamics.

Rather than adopt the European Union’s model for regulating competition, policymakers considering how to govern digital markets should carefully evaluate whether digital antitrust regulation is justified and consider whether concerns about anticompetitive behavior can be addressed with less intrusive and more cost-effective tools.

Critics on both sides of the aisle view the “private power” of dominant tech firms as unassailable and protected by anticompetitive conduct, but their alleged monopoly power is often overstated.

By deciding not to pursue digital competition regulation, Australia can avoid the problems that are already materializing as a result of ex-ante regimes like the EU’s DMA.